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In 1990, at the end of the East-West conflict, a new actor with a different status 
and attitude appeared in the European political arena: the united Germany. The evolving 
European system poses special challenges for Germany and the United States, raising 
questions about their ability to influence the course of events. In fact, German-American 
relations during the 1990-1997 period played a central role in satisfying the post-Cold 
War needs of Bonn and Washington. In the new European state system, the new 
Ostpolitik, European integration, and a continued German-American security connection 
within the Atlantic Alliance are the defining elements. This thesis examines some of the 
implications of NATO's new cooperative relations with former adversaries in Central and 
Eastern Europe and of the construction process of the European Security and Defense 
Identity for the international system and for the shared interests and policies (and national 
power) of Germany and the United States. It also analyzes how these developments 
might affect the future European security architecture and the transatlantic relationship. 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
With the end of the East-West conflict, after Germany's unification in 1990, the 
accumulated weight of German power-unguided by any clear sense of direction-was 
pressing against transatlantic and West European institutions that were themselves in flux 
and that may yet prove inadequate to guide the European political order toward the new 
century. Questions about the adequacy of the transatlantic and West European political 
compacts raised the danger that the new Germany would embark on a European policy 
insufficiently enveloped and sustained by its traditional institutional contexts. 
Furthermore, the present emerging European system poses a special challenge 
also to the United States. If the Americans hope to keep in step with the evolution of the 
European order and influence it constructively and farsightedly, they must redefine the 
"double containment policy"-in both its Russian and German dimensions-that guided 
their actions during the Cold War. If the United States fails to meet this challenge, it 
should not expect to retain its diplomatic leverage in Europe. 
At the same time, the Germans require a supportive transatlantic and West 
European context for their exertions. They should not be induced to embark on an 
autonomous European policy, however indirectly or inadvertently. Nor is there any 
indication that they wish to do so. 
In this context, this thesis aims to advance understanding of how German-
American relations during the 1990-1997 period played a central role in satisfying the 
post-Cold War needs of Bonn and Washington. In the new European state system, the 
new Ostpolitik, European integration, and a continued German-American security 
connection within the Atlantic Alliance are the defining elements. Taking into account 
the fact that in the past Germany had so little political and diplomatic leeway in choosing 
among conflicting foreign policies, this thesis also assesses the influence of the new 
German foreign and security policies (developed after the unification in 1990) for the 
emerging European state system. 
Finally, the thesis examines the way in which Germans themselves resisted the 
temptation to affirm their political identity through reflexive opposition or unquestioning 
allegiance to American policies, and the process that made the Americans recognize that 
the new Federal Republic of Germany has become a more influential regional power and 
that even an ally cannot determine the interests of its partner on the partner's behalf. 
These elements support the analysis of a relationship, which represents so much for 
America, for Europe, and for Germany. 
ix 
The findings might be summarized as follows: There can be no doubt that the 
continuities of the Cold War are gone and that a fundamentally new German-American 
relationship emerged after the transition period of 1990-1992. The old concept of 
leadership, in which problems, resources and choices were often clear and implied 
German deference to American decisions, is no longer efficient. Thus, the new German-
American relationship requires a more realistic assessment of needs and resources, 
including the recognition that burden-sharing is essential, and, perhaps, that uncertainties 
about outcomes need to be communicated to publics before action is taken. 
However, Germany's commitment to European integration and the Franco-
German couple is essential for the country's security, and stabilization to the East is of 
great importance as well (the complementarity shown by Germany and the U.S. during 
the process of NATO enlargement proved this well). 
NATO remains the key institution in the German strategy. Germany can not 
afford to decide between Paris and Washington, and it might become increasingly 
difficult for Bonn to balance the Franco-American couple. In this setting, with the 
unification of Europe a medium or long-term perspective, with the prospects for a 
coherent EU military policy-or even a functioning ESDI-uncertain at best, with an 
increasing European military dependence on the Americans, and with German defense 
budgets under great pressure, Germany might in the near future give priority to its 
American partner. The German-American duo might then become even more prominent 
and assume a de facto leading role in developing and implementing NATO's priorities 
and policies (toward both Western and Eastern Europe), at the expense of the French and 
the British. 
The Alliance's multiple missions must therefore be carefully reconsidered. The 
resiliency of NATO can be only partly understood in the light of its role as a continued 




A. NATO AND POST-COLD WAR GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
The strategic, political, and economic developments of the last decade, although 
important in their own right, were only manifestations of deeper historical trends in the 
post-Second World War era. For underneath the technical disputes about military 
strategy and economics, and underlying the conflicts that corroded the transatlantic 
compact and slowed the progress of West European integration, there was a powerful 
current of socioeconomic, political, and psychological forces, which exerted a steady pull 
on the governments of Western Europe and the United States. These forces were the 
combined result of the changing nature of the state and the new ways in which states 
interact in the modem state system. 
With the end of the East-West conflict, the emerging state system in Europe and 
in the world at large is a peculiar amalgam of past and present, moving toward an 
uncertain future. It might be described as multidimensional, contradictory, and in 
transition. It is infused with forces of economic and technological modernity and the 
social values that attend them, but also beset by historical memories, aspirations, and 
attitudes that are obsolescent and yet resilient, bending to atavistic inclinations. 
In this context, after unification, the pre-1989 accumulated weight of German 
power-unguided by any clear sense of direction-was pressing against transatlantic and 
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West European institutions that were themselves in flux and that may yet prove 
inadequate to guide the European political order toward the new century. The combined 
inadequacy of the transatlantic and West European political compacts raised the danger 
that the new Germany would embark on a European policy insufficiently enveloped and 
sustained by its traditional institutional contexts. As the historic post-Second World War 
constraints on German foreign policy changed, whether and how these institutions could 
continue to provide a supportive and mutually acceptable framework for the energies of 
the new German diplomacy came into question. 
The present emerging European system poses a special chaHenge also to the 
United States. If the Americans hope to keep in step with the evolution of the European 
order and influence it constructively and farsightedly, they must redefine the "double 
containment policy"-in both its Russian and German dimensions-that guided their 
actions during the Cold War. If the United States fails to meet this challenge, it should 
not expect to retain its diplomatic leverage in Europe. 
At the same time, the Germans require a supportive transatlantic and West 
European context for their exertions. They should not be induced to embark on an 
autonomous European policy, however indirectly or inadvertently. Nor is there any 
indication that they wish to do so. The Federal Republic of Germany has always been 
highly sensitive to its singularity within the North Atlantic Alliance in political as well as 
military and strategic matters, and a Sonderweg was imposed to Bonn within NATO from 
the beginning. The singularity of the Germans' historic position in Europe might be 
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considered burdensome enough without being compounded by their continuing 
singularity in the Alliance. 
In this context, this thesis aims to advance understanding on how German-
American relations during the 1990-1997 period played a central role in fulfilling the 
post-Cold War needs of Bonn and Washington. In the new European state system, the 
new Ostpolitik, European integration, and a continued German-American security 
connection are the defining elements. Taking into account the fact that in the past 
Germany had so little political leeway and diplomatic maneuverability in choosing 
among conflicting foreign policies, this thesis also assesses the influence of the new 
German foreign and security policies (developed after the unification) for the post-1989 
emerging European state system. 
Finally, the thesis examines the way in which Germans themselves resisted the 
temptation to affirm their political identity through reflexive opposition or unquestioning 
allegiance to American policies, and the process that made the Americans recognize that 
the new Federal Republic of Germany has become a regional superpower and that even 
an ally cannot determine the interests of its partner on the partner's behalf. These 
elements complete the analysis of a relationship that represents so much for America, for 
Europe, and for Germany. 
The exploration of the above mentioned topics is necessary because it raises 
important issues about how we should think about NATO and its future. The dual 
mission of the Alliance must be carefully reconsidered. The resiliency of NATO can be 
3 
only partly understood in the light of its role as a continued insurance policy against 
Russian backsliding, or because of its collective defense mission. 
Equally important is the role to be played by the united Germany. Fundamental to 
the Western community was the diffuse reciprocal agreement between Bonn and the 
Allies, led by the United States, concerning German reunification. In exchange for the 
allied guarantee of equality and of promoting of its eventual unification, Germany 
integrated into the West. Germany has now reunited as a democratic state, and has 
therefore attained the unification that wedded it so loyally to the West. The indication is 
therefore that a strong Western community has arisen. 
However, such indicators might be premature. The united Germany is 
questioning anew its rightful place in post-Cold War Europe and reassessing its national 
interests. How much effort the new Germany will devote to sustaining the community-
building institutions that brought it to this point remains to be seen. Germany's role is 
now less clear than ever. Assuming that community-building does remain valid for the 
recasting of NATO and transatlantic relations, whose community-building scheme will be 
applied to incorporate the former East bloc? These are central questions that require an 
answers in the coming years. 
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B. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The second chapter concentrates on the German-American relationship during the 
1990-1992 period, an era of cooperation and coordination between two close allies in the 
new post-Cold War environment. Both Bonn and Washington needed to start redefining, 
at that specific moment, how to manage equality and relinquish responsibility. 
The third chapter focuses on German and American attitudes in 1990-1997 toward 
the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and NATO's internal adaptation, 
examining the rationales and reactions of the two countries concerning the major 
decisions taken regarding these developments. The role of France in this process is 
carefully examined. The final remarks emphasize that, in 1995-1997, it became more 
difficult for Germany to address its Franco-American priorities. And, with the real 
unification of Europe a long-term perspective, in the immediate future, Bonn (and Berlin) 
might give higher priority to the Americans. 
The fourth chapter traces the influence of German and American policies toward 
(a) NATO's cooperation with former Central and Eastern European (CEE) adversaries 
and (b) the European security architecture in the 1990-1997 period. It also examines 
some of the rationales that led to the 1997 Madrid decisions in the process of NATO's 
enlargement. The answer to the questions concerning "why" and "who" in the 
enlargement process is to be found in the strong influence of the German-American 
security relationship on NATO's decision-making process. 
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The fifth and final chapter sums up the conclusions. The thesis concludes that 
after the Cold War a fundamentally new German-American relationship emerged. The 
two countries now have a security partnership in which they are more equal in their 
mutual dependence. Furthermore, with the unification of Europe a medium or long-term 
perspective and with the prospects for a coherent EU military policy uncertain at best, 
Germany might in the near future give priority to its American partner, to the regret of the 
French. 
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II. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND GERMAN-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After the Second World War, beginning with the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, a 
global alliance system was at the center of American strategic thought. The relationship 
with Europe was perceived as an important element of the security architecture that was 
to be developed. However, the world changed dramatically in 1989-1991 through four 
separate but connected events: the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe 
during the late 1980s; the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989; the unification of 
Germany in October 1990; and the failure of the attempted coup in August 1991 and the 
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991. 
In this context, the European Community (EC) itself became a different player in 
the international arena, owing in part to its transformation into the European Union (EU) 
with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993. For the EU 
countries, security was no longer as pressing and imperative, and other priorities could 
receive more attention. Moreover, relationships that proved to be very efficient and 
predictable during the Cold War period (such as the West German-American relationship) 
witnessed unforeseeable developments. 
Throughout the history of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949-1989, its 
foreign policy aims remained remarkably constant: security, reunification, and political 
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rehabilitation and economic reconstruction in the context of the Western Europe and the 
Atlantic Alliance. As the political, strategic and economic configurations of power 
changed, so did the mix of restraints and opportunities confronting West German foreign 
policies. Necessities became coupled with possibilities. Thus, three distinct phases 
emerged in the Cold War period, during which the complementarities and contradictions 
in West German foreign policy were shaped in significantly different ways. 1 
In the first phase, the formative years from 1949 to the late 1950s, the Cold War 
contest between the two power blocs, the historical burdens of the past, and the Federal 
Republic's lack of sovereignty presented it with the most severe restraints and led to 
fundamental contradictions between West German foreign policy goals in the West and 
the East. 
In the second phase, from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, an additional set of 
contradictions was placed on West German policy, leading to a fragmentation of its 
previously coherent Western policy. The Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the 
United States and sought to legitimize rather than alter the European status quo, while de 
Gaulle was determined to gain a global role for a Europe led by France, even at the 
expense of Atlantic unity. This forced Bonn to choose between its central security 
1 For an analysis of West German foreign policy in 1949-1989 see, for example, Peter R. Merkl, German 
Foreign Policies, West & East: On the Treshold of a New European Era (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1974), 
Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1989), Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the 
Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., West German Foreign 
Policy: 1949-1979 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), and Edwina S. Campbell, Germany's Past & 
Europe's Future: The Challenges of West German Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's 
International Defense Publishers, 1989). 
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interests in NATO and its central economic interests and political aspirations in Western 
Europe. These choices carried with them important ramifications for Germany's Eastern 
policy as well. 
In the third phase, the 1970s and 1980s, three elements affected West German 
foreign policy goals. First, the elements of international power and its overall 
configurations changed considerably, diminishing the relative power of the Americans 
and making for a much more complicated global and European environment. This setting 
required fewer clear-cut choices from West German foreign policy makers. 
Second, Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, the centerpiece of the efforts of 
East-West detente, obtained a more active role for West German foreign policy. It had 
become an integral part of NATO security policy and West German policy because it 
reflected the dual principles of NATO's 1967 Harmel Report: deterrence coupled with 
political negotiations. 
Third, although the emerging primacy of economic and monetary matters and the 
ramifications of global economic interdependence increased the Federal Republic's 
political leverage, they further complicated German-American relations in this period. 
This relationship was already burdened by conflicting assessments of the meaning of 
detente, the infirmities and ambiguities of Washington's security and arms control 
policies, and mutual recriminations over diplomatic style as well as political substance.2 
2 See Garton Ash, chapter II (Ostpolitik) and Merkl, chapter III (Gennan Foreign Policies). 
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Despite the above mentioned elements, for forty years (1949-1989) the 
relationship between West Germany and the United States was a pivotal element of the 
Western security system. During the Cold War the two countries worked together to 
shape the basic elements of a common political, economic and military system. With the 
beginning of the 1990s, two of the foundations of the close German-American 
relationship collapsed. The common Soviet threat disappeared and Germany was 
reunited, thus becoming an actor with a different status and attitude, and distinct interests 
in the European political arena. 
Given their intrinsic importance, developments III German-American relations 
immediately after the end of the Cold War (1990-1992) deserve closer scrutiny. This 
chapter argues that during this period, certain factors made the two countries adopt 
different approaches on issues concerning the interests and actions of the Western 
Alliance system, and that disagreements led to a change in the bilateral relationship and 
new terms for political cooperation and coordination. 
B. THE NEW GERMANY, THE NEW AMERICA AND THEIR SEARCH 
FOR NEW IDENTITIES 
"Germany, suddenly united, is facing immense difficulties not only in completing 
its own unification but also defining its new European and global role."3 In the process 
3 Richard W. Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift? (Boulder: Westwiew Press, 
1993), p. 27. 
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of unification, the United States offered the necessary leadership for implementing 
Chancellor Kohl's vision. President Bush's early decision to commit America to German 
unity permitted the "German chancellor to follow his instincts, assured of the backing of 
Germany's most powerful ally."4 At the same time, "Bush pressed Kohl to close off any 
attempts to compromise Germany's position in NATO"5 and in return the U.S. "adopted 
German ideas about handling the status of East Germany. "6 
The centrality of Germany to Europe supports the judgement that "the character of 
the new German state that emerged-fully sovereign and unequivocally anchored in 
Western institutions-will determine in large part the shape of the new Europe."7 Thus, 
Germany's unification was a moment of triumph and also one of doubt for the new 
country and its allies. 
At the same time the united Germany is a different creature from West 
Germany. It has different boundaries, different neighbors, different 
priorities, different policies, and a different weight. Furthermore it is fully 
sovereign, and thus has to pursue policies that will be different from West 
Germany. It will also develop a greater consciousness of its own 
independent role and interests than West Germany had. As the Federal 
Republic of Germany, it might have the same official name as the former 
West Germany, but it is not the same identity. 8 
4 Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 367. 
5 Alexander Moens, "American diplomacy and German unification," Survival, vol. XXX 
(NovemberlDecember 1991), p. 543. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Rice and Zelikow, p. 366. 
8 Smyser, p. 31. 
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The new Germany started to see that its priorities differed in some ways from 
those of the leader of the victorious Western coalition, the United States. An active 
contribution in helping to reshape the "New World Order"9 seemed to be a delicate and 
important task for the new political entity, because there were at least two areas in which 
the German government wanted to pursue a path at variance with that followed by the 
United States. 
One area was economics. After unification, Germany and its financial capital, 
Frankfurt, seemed to have real prospects to become the true financial center of Europe. 
Thus, the Bundesbank could enhance its position as the most powerful player in European 
monetary matters and might have more influence over global monetary rates than it did 
before 1990. That is of immense importance for the entire world. The strict economic 
criteria imposed on the European Union (EU) countries in order to meet the 1997-1999 
convergence requirements of the impending European Monetary Union (EMU) may well 
define either the Deutsche Mark or the euro as the most stable currency in the world. In 
1993, referring to the euro by its earlier name ofECU (European currency unit), Richard 
Smyser offered the following judgement: 
9 The meaning of the concept is the one specifically used by the Bush administration. 
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Such a stable currency, pledged against periodic devaluation, will attract 
investors and producers. If the U.S. dollar were to continue to lose value, 
raw material producers might well demand that their commodity prices be 
denominated in marks or Ecus instead of dollars, or at least in some basket 
of currencies including marks or a European currency. This would give 
united Germany and Europe considerable authority to manage the flow of 
global goods and to attract the kinds of investments that now often go to 
the dollar. 10 
This could significantly affect U.S. economic interests by introducing a powerful 
deflationary force in the global monetary system. Stability-oriented German (and 
European) policies could make it impossible for the Americans to manage their currency 
as freely as in the past. It would also require to the U.S. to review some of its monetary 
policies, to reduce the risk of devaluation in the face of an alternative global currency. I I 
Another area was diplomacy. Throughout the postwar period West Germany's 
security policy was shaped by a unique set of factors: national partition, the burdens of 
German history, doubts about German democracy, and the reality of being a front line 
state confronted with overwhelming Soviet power. 12 NATO and the extended American 
nuclear deterrent guaranteed West Germany's security in the 1949-1989 period, 
supported the West German effort to achieve Western European political and economic • 
integration, and were considered essential to the eventual unification of the two 
Germanys. Chancellor Kohl stated in 1988 that: "the western alliance is part of our 
IO Richard W. Smyser, "The Global Economic Effects of Gennan Unification," in Garry L. Geipel, ed., 
Germany in a New Era (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1993), p. 271. 
II Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?, p. 33. 
12 Ronald Asmus, "The Future of Gennan Strategic Thinking," in Gary L. Geipel, ed., Germany in a New 
Era (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1993), p. 142. 
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Staatsraison" and that NATO represented the "cornerstone of [West German] security 
policy."13 
Traditionally an "importer" of security and a beneficiary of Western collective 
defense, the new Germany further believed that "security" means not only military force 
but also diplomatic instruments. Faced with the question of whether it is now the 
moment to "become an exporter of Western political values, economic influence, and 
security," 14 it tried to move the Western Alliance toward flexible diplomatic 
arrangements,15 which were considered supplements at least of some of the military 
structures, even though Germany wanted the established structures such as NATO and 
the ED to remain in place. In this context, the German preference for a set of 
"interlocking institutions" has became a key component of NATO's lexicon, reflecting 
the need for complementarity of those institutions. 16 
A motivation for the German actions could be found in James Sperling's remarks: 
... [T]he sources of cohesion in the Alliance have undergone a subtle but 
significant change. NATO member states, to be sure, share common 
interests, but the Germans argue that common values are the glue that 
holds the alliance together. For the Germans, the American role in Europe 
13 Helmuth Kohl, "Die Streitkrafte als wichtigtes Instrument der Sicherheitspolitik," 13 December 1988, in 
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin, 175 (16 December 1988), p. 1550-1551. As 
quoted in James Sperling, "German Security Policy, " in German Unification: Process and Outcome, in 
Donald M. Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 263-264. 
14 Asmus, p. 142. 
15 Such as: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the new EU-WEU links specified in the 
Maastricht Treaty, and the new role of the CSCE in providing the basis for a pan-European security 
system. 
16 See North Atlantic Council Communique, 19 December 1991. 
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has evolved into the explicit role of night watchman. The necessity of 
NATO for the success of the EC-WEU in forging a European defense 
identity or the CSCE in providing the basis of a pan-European security 
system has forced the Germans to argue against the [American supported] 
proposition that NATO, EC-WEU, and the CSCE have conflicting 
purposes or conflicting logics. Hence, the Germans, adopted the slogan 
'sowohl-als-auch' (this as well as that) and the emphatic rejection of 
'entweder-oder' (either this or that) in their discussions of the future 
institutional constellation of the future European security order. 17 
These attitudes, emphasizing powerful new German roles and missions, received 
immediate reactions, especially in the West. France and Britain questioned whether 
Germany should have so much influence in shaping Europe. I8 The Americans showed 
ambivalence: they wanted a strong and united Germany, but they reacted with 
considerable suspicion and even alarm to German policies that did not follow the postwar 
pattern. 
A good illustration is the American reaction to the post-1989 redimensioned 
Franco-German relationship. At the core of the new Europe, the Paris-Bonn axis could 
influence decisively major options and trends. France, like Germany, has been primarily 
a continental power, although it has historically played a much more global role than 
Germany. France has long resisted and resented American dominance in Europe. It also 
has its own nuclear force, a separate military identity, and its own agenda regarding the 
European Security and Defense Identity. Thus, in the new environment, the Americans 
17 James Sperling, "German Security Policy, "in Donald M. Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds., German 
Unification: Process and Outcome (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 264. 
18 See, for example, for Britain: Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years: 1979-1990 (New York: 
HarperCoIIins Publishers, 1993), and for France: Patrick Mc Carthy, ed., France-Germany, 1983-1993 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1993). 
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considered that revived Franco-German cooperation might threaten the dominant U.S. 
position in Europe. 19 
The United States perceived that Germany, focusing on Europe's problems and 
trying to establish a continental security system, might need France more than it needs 
America, at least with regard to European construction. The Paris-Bonn (and later Paris-
Berlin) connection could provide a political and strategic core for Europe itself. 
Depending on its practical implementation, such a development could go to the heart of 
the future organization of the continent and to the heart of the American role in Europe 
and even to the American position in the world. 
In this setting, the first signs that the German-American relationship might be on a 
different trend gained visibility. Thus, the search for the appropriate terms for the new 
cooperation-accepted in both countries by the publics as well by the governments-had 
begun.2o 
Most Americans welcomed the end of the Cold War because it represented the 
end the division of Europe. Nonetheless, the U.S. Congress and the American public 
embraced a cautious attitude regarding the commitments to be made to Eastern Europe or 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It was obvious that the Americans 
were not prepared to extend the same type of commitments that they had made to 
19 See, for example, Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany and the Western Alliance (Boulder: Westview 
Press, Inc., 1995). 
20 See Christoph Bertram, "US-German Relations in a World at Sea," Daedalus 121 (Fall 1992), pp. 120-
123. 
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Western Europe, but envisaged engaging in "limited operations." This attitude was 
especially obvious during the crisis that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. The 
United States expected major European actions before American forces were committed 
on a large and definitive scale; thus the American discussion was dominated by speeches 
about what America's allies should do, even when the U.S. itself was prepared to do very 
little.21 
The Western victory in the Cold War gave the debates in 1990-1992 about 
economic policies and about the role of the government a new dimension. America 
turned its focus inward, beset by domestic issues and associated worries and priorities. It 
was a period characterized by political, economic, and social change. The future of U.S. 
foreign policy was added to the debate and, in this context, the concept of a "peace 
dividend" did not prove to be as significant as had been hoped.22 
Furthermore, America started to look for rationales to cut its overseas 
commitments. Proposals to disengage from Cold War security commitments and to 
exercise greater restraint in intervening or assuming obligations overseas23 made the 
West Europeans fear that isolationism might become the dominant trend in U.S. foreign 
policy. George F. Kennan recalled John Quincy Adams's words that: "America goes not 
abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well wisher to the freedom and 
21 Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?, pp. 39-48. 
22 Ibid., p. 46. 
23 See, for example, Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1995). 
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independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own."24 Many 
analysts were inclined to believe that the U.S. might go "back to the womb." 25 
Moreover, it seemed that the U.S. might turn its attention to the Americas or to 
the Asia-Pacific region to the detriment of Europe. Traditionally, the Western debate on 
European security was centered on NATO and carried out as a dialogue between North 
America and Western Europe. But this relationship, based on the security requirements 
of a divided Europe, looked like it was losing its relevance. Under domestic pressures 
and, thus, not only the because the Cold War was over, issues of economic security were 
increasingly seen in Washington as being as important as issues of military security. The 
Asia-Pacific region also represented an area of economic dynamism, with markets 
experiencing rapid rates of growth.26 As Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated 
later, "Western Europe is no longer the dominant area of the world."27 
A more important factor in defining new U.S. priorities was that the American 
government and people started to realize that the United States depended on foreign 
resources and foreign markets. This realization was complemented with the perspective 
24 John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, address on July 4, 1823, cited in George F. Kennan, "On 
American Principles," Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995), p. 118. 
25 The title of an incisive article written by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb: Isolationism's 
Renewed Threat," Foreign Ajfairs, vol. 74, no. 40 (July/August 1995), pp. 2-8. 
26 For a complete analysis of the impact of the possible U.S. orientation toward Pacific on the transatlantic 
relationship, see Robert O'Brien, "Manifest Destiny and the Pacific Century: Europe as No.3," in Jarod 
Wiener, ed., The Transatlantic Relationship (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 95-127. 
27 The Guardian, 18 October 1993. 
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that "[t]he United States now needs allies and friends even when it does not have 
enemies."28 A precise balance of the moral and strategic elements of U.S. foreign policy 
and the definition of the national interest were required as an essential guide to American 
policy.29 Thus, in the post-Cold War environment the "moral" justification for continuing 
U.S. international involvement has finally been put in the proper context: 
The United States no longer pretends that moral principle is the primary 
driving force behind the country's security policy. Rather, it is recognized 
that economics and politics require the maintenance of a large military 
establishment and the occasional use of force. As energy and other forms 
of economic interdependence grew, the American standard of living was 
tied more closely than ever to the country's ability to influence the 
developments abroad by power politics. This often demands that the 
United States associate with regimes that do not share America's 
democratic values ... International politics does not permit the United 
States the lUxury of ideological purity.3D 
It might be concluded that, at the end of the Cold War, at least three principal American 
strategic interests in the world were evident: 
1. To maintain the U.S. as the premier global power; 
2. To prevent the emergence of a political-military hegemonic power in Eurasia; 
and, 
28 Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?, p. 47. 
29 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone Rockefeller Center, 1994), pp. 810-812. 
3D Lawrence 1. Korb, "The United States," in Douglas 1. Murray & Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense 
Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1994), p. 32. 
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3. To protect concrete American interests in the Third World, which are primarily in 
the Persian Gulf and Central America.31 
Given these elements, one of the important questions at the beginning of the 
1990s for Germany was whether the U.S. government could find the proper balance 
between domestic and foreign commitments, and whether the Americans could formulate 
effective policies to deal with their allies during the search for a proper balance. 
When the Americans supported the reunification of Germany in 1989, they fully 
expected that a new united Germany would support American foreign policy and help 
maintain the Western alliance system as "partners in leadership."32 Bonn and 
Washington wanted to work together to adapt the political security system that both 
countries had helped to build in the Cold War environment. Although the two countries 
wanted common security, they operate in different areas, at different levels, and in 
different ways. They look at the world from very different locations and historical 
perspectives. 
Germany's new identity went beyond new borders. It looked more self-confident, 
stronger, richer, and potentially more influential. Germany's new stature-in terms of 
equality and independence-looked as if it might be difficult for the U.S. to accept. 
America seemed more ambivalent, less ready to make new commitments, more anxious 
31 See Samuel P. Huntington, "America's changing strategic interests," Survival, vol. XXXIII 
(January/February 1991), pp. 3-17. 
32 See President's Bush speech, "Proposals for a Free and Peaceful Europe" delivered in May 1989 and 
reprinted by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Current Policy, no. 1, 179, June 1989. 
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to remain at home, and yet, paradoxically, more global in its interests and concerns. The 
United States was discovering that, since unification, its relationship with Germany could 
be complex and unpredictable. As Christoph Bertram wrote in 1992: 
Today, Germany and the United States can no longer take for granted the 
basis they built over forty years. In the United States, a new 
administration, Democratic or Republican, whatever its intentions, is 
likely to see Germany more as a commercial competitor than a partner in 
leadership. In Germany, with the fragmenting of its party system and the 
economic uncertainties stemming from unification, not to speak of other 
social tensions, a change of government in 1994 is at least conceivable. 
With a new team at the helm, less instinctively pro-American and pro-
European than that led in the past ten years by Helmut Kohl, there is some 
prospect of new directions being taken. Changes that in the past occurred 
in a known environment, will happen in an unknown one.33 
Under these circumstances, an evaluation of some aspects of their political 
cooperation and coordination in 1990-1992 might provide answers for questions that 
seemed to be, at that moment in time, fundamental for U.S.-German relations:34 
• Was the U.S. prepared to accept a German government that shared its basic 
interests but might pursue different policies? 
• Could the post-Second World War intimacy remain even if the nature of the 
mutual military and diplomatic dependence had changed? 
• Would Germany-with a new status and redefined interests-still accept a 
tone of superiority from the U.S. government? 
33 Bertram, p. 126. 
34 Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?, p. 50. 
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C. POLITICAL COOPERATION AND DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES 
With the disappearance of the division of Gennany, the new political entity 
obtained new neighbors and took greater responsibility for its relations with Central and 
Eastern European countries. While the purpose of its policy of detente in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s was to lessen mistrust and to provide security guarantees regarding the 
status quo, the new task was to develop close cooperative ties with these states that would 
enable them to make progress towards democracy and free-market economic 
arrangements. 
its 
The Ostpolitik pursued during the period from late 1960s to the late 1980s had as 
.. .long-tenn goal the reunification of Gennany ... [and] .. .it was also 
designed to advance the coming of a European peace order by way of full 
recognition of the sovereignty and frontiers of existing East European 
states, including paradoxically, the Gennan Democratic Republic [GDR] , 
and to bring to these countries economic and political refonn.35 
Despite its limitations, there is no doubt that West Gennany's Ostpolitik created 
an atmosphere that encouraged detente (Entspannung) in Europe and, in general, it 
legitimized and brought some benefits to the Eastern European regimes, and, thus, 
remained popular in West Gennany.36 In this setting, when Gennan unification became 
35 It was also characterized by contradictions: its practitioners tended to become so deeply involved in 
promoting the latter objective, more difficult to achieve, that they tended to neglect and even forget the 
former. See Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our 
Time (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 120. 
36 Ibid., p. 127. 
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again a political issue (1989-1990), German security experts such as Helga Haftendorn 
argued as follows: 
Germany's interest with regard to the states of Central and Eastern Europe 
is of a political, military, and economic nature. It would like the process 
of democratization and liberalization to continue and the countries to 
develop stable political structures. Military priorities dictate a reduction of 
the existing arms arsenals in the region and the prevention of military 
conflicts between and within these states.37 
Taking into account the difficulties of fully integrating the former GDR, market-
oriented economies in CEE might offer export markets for German goods, investment 
possibilities for German capital, and supplies of necessary raw materials for German 
industry. The markets seemed ideally suited for penetration, but that would require 
political stability. This became an imperative solution because: 
Many of the problems confronting Germany in the mid-1990s are the 
consequence of an unprecedented legal-institutional merger of two highly 
disparate institutional societies [the former FRG and GDR]. Mass 
expectations concerning the anticipated benefits of unification have proved 
unrealistic, at least in the short run. Exacerbating domestic problems of 
integration are destabilizing external economic factors and political 
upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe.38 
37 Helga Haftendorn, "Gulliver in the Center of Europe: International Involvement and National 
Capabilities for Action," in Bertel Heurlin, ed., Germany and Europe in the Nineties (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1996), p. 107. 
38 Donald M. Hancock, "Economic and Political Performance: Patterns and Prospects," in Donald M. 
Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds., German Unification: Process and Outcome (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994), p. 245. The domestic social and political constraints caused by the reunification process make 
Germany consider that it is in its fundamental interest to stabilize its Eastern perimeter and prevent tremors 
in its own political and social systems that could be caused by a new influx of refugees, a further 
penetration of organized crime, or the spread of ethnic conflict and civil war. 
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In this setting, in order to cope with these simultaneous demands on the country's 
economic and social resources, Germany's leaders considered that support for democratic 
reforms was of vital German (and European) interest, and the stabilization of Germany's 
immediate Central European hinterland became an urgent task. A strategy to extend 
Western institutions eastward-at least to the Visegrad states-was justified in economic 
and geostrategic terms. As Josef Joffe concluded, Germany considered itself at "the 
forefront of those who would attach the Central European quartet to the EU and NATO 
while taking care not to do so too blatantly for fear of alienating Russia."39 The new 
realities of Europe transformed the unacceptable Drang nach Osten into Zwang nach 
Osten,40 as a key for successful mediation between Germany and the CEE states. 
In this context, Germany took the initiative in organizing aid for the CIS, the 
arrangement linking most of the states of the former Soviet Union, and for the separate 
states within the CIS. It had also given more aid than any other Western country to 
Russia and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. Between 1989 and the end of 1992 it 
supplied $50 billion, compared with $9 billion from the U.S.41 Germany pressed for 
39 Josef Joffe, "No Threats, No Temptations: German Grand Strategy After the Cold War," in Bertel 
Heuriin, ed., Germany and Europe in the Nineties (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 270. Germany 
could seek to bring CEE into the EU and NATO orbit and, failing that, into its own. But it might pursue a 
"Greater Central-European Co-Prosperity Sphere" with prudence, taking care not to alienate Russia or to 
stimulate Western suspicions. 
40 See Gregory F. Treverton, America, Germany and the Future of Europe (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), pp. 199-205. 
41 The trend remained the same in 1993: Germany alone transferred another $20 billion to Russia, 
compared with less than $4 billion from the U.S. See David Haglund, "Germany's Central European 
Conundrum," European Security, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 30. 
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Russian membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), pledged its share for a 
fund to stabilize the ruble, and asked the other Western governments to help during the 
G-7 meeting in January 1992 and at the Munich G-7 summit in July 1992. German 
diplomats and trade officials pushed hard to ease restrictions on technology exports to the 
former communist states.42 
Disagreement with the Americans came from the U.S. priorities at that moment in 
Europe. The American government perceived some of the same problems that Germany 
saw to its East, but the end ofthe Cold War meant for it that the global balance of power 
would not tum on Europe as it had since 1945. For the United States, Europe was only a 
part of the world, even though it was (and remains) the part that Germany regards as the 
main arena for its own interests. And if there was an American concern about Europe at 
that moment, it was no longer about Russia or about Eastern Europe. 
Instead, the Americans were concerned about the main direction that Western 
Europe would take. They feared that the attempt to build European institutions based on 
opposition to the United States might in the end wreck both European unity and Atlantic 
cohesion. A separate West European path in political, military, and economic affairs, 
announced by the dispute "between the concepts of Richelieu and the ideas of Wilson-
between foreign policy as a balancing of interests and diplomacy as an affirmation of an 
underlying harmonY,"43 was not a welcome perspective in Washington. 
42 Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift, p. 55. 
43 Kissinger, p. 822. 
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However, America has been much more willing than other states to concede that 
Germany has a leading role in world affairs. The U.S. government supported Germany's 
permanent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, although France 
and Great Britain initially opposed it. The Americans thought that such involvement 
would support U.S. as well as German interests, but Washington has often found Bonn, 
its political class and German public opinion, less ready to act than Americans would 
prefer.44 It was the heritage of over 40 years in which "German politicians have been 
extremely sensitive to avoid the impression of being nationalistic, 'imperialistic' or in any 
way following the footsteps of the hegemonic power ambitions of Germany's terrible 
past."45 
The work of global political cooperation, including the selective use of force, has 
not waited for Bonn and Washington to sort out their disagreements. The most 
pronounced differences between the two countries arose with respect to the Gulf War in 
1990-1991 and the Yugoslav crisis of 1991-1992. 
44 Especially regarding German involvement in new military missions, "the culture of reticence" was still 
dominant among the political elite and general public. See, for example, Ronald Asmus, German Strategy 
and Opinion after the Wall 1990-1993 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1994), pp. 61-65. 
45 Ekkehart Krippendorf, "Germany as a World/European Power," in Bertel Heurlin, ed., Germany and 
Europe in the Nineties (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 71. 
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D. THE GULF WAR AND THE 1991-1992 YUGOSLAV CRISIS 
The Gulf crisis that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990-which 
coincided historically with the German unification-showed that the Germany of 1990-
1992 was not inclined to undertake global obligations and that it might even hesitate 
about some European obligations. Germany's reaction to the conflict was profoundly 
marked by the legacy of the post-Second World War period. Given the fact that several 
treaties were not ratified46 and that the Soviet military withdrawal from Germany was not 
confirmed in legal terms, the German government did not send combat forces to the Gulf 
despite U.S. requests for at least some support47, although it did send minesweepers to 
the Eastern Mediterranean.48 
This attitude was justified by reports of Soviet warnings that the deployment of 
German forces in the Gulf would jeopardize Supreme Soviet ratification of German unity 
46 Such as the CFE Treaty, the German Unification Treaty and the CSCE Final Act. 
47 On 30 August 1990, the Bush administration publicly requested that other countries share the financial 
burdens that resulted from the need to support countries affected by the economic sanctions and from the 
military presence in the Gulf. On the same day, President Bush called Chancellor Kohl and asked for 
German support without specifying its nature. Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Germany and the Iraq 
Conflict," from Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, eds., Western Europe and the Gulf: A study of West 
European reactions to the Gulf war carried out under the auspices of the Institute for Security Studies of 
Western European Union (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union), p. 43. 
48 On 16 August 1990 Germany ordered five mine countermeasures vessels and two supply ships to a 
NATO naval base on Crete to assist in the protection of shipping lanes on the Southern Flank. In early 
February 1991, a group consisting of two German destroyers, two frigates, and two supply ships augmented 
NATO's naval presence in the Mediterranean. In March 1991, the German minesweeping detachment was 
transferred from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf to participate in clearing mined shipping lanes. 
Finally it was authorized by the German government to participate in multinational coordination activities 
under the European banner of the WEU. Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
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and might delay the departure of Soviet troops from Germany.49 It was also meant not to 
send any signals that might strengthen the position of the hard line opposition in 
Moscow. Bonn's concerns were correctly perceived by Germany's allies, in particular the 
United States. 50 
Despite the fact that U.S. officials had not explicitly asked Germany to participate 
in the forces assembled under General Norman Schwarzkopfs command in the Gulf, 
there were voices in Washington51 and inside the North Atlantic Alliance52 that expressed 
irritation and criticized the slowness of the German reaction and the evident intentions of 
the German government to remain uninvolved53 in a situation that the American political 
elite believed should concern others as much as itself. 
Two other important issues that caused disturbances in Germany's relations with 
the U.S. were the question of assisting Turkey against a possible Iraqi attack, and, above 
all the Scud missiles fired at Israel by the Iraqis. 
First, the American military establishment was extremely worried by the delay of 
several weeks in the German contribution to the ACE Mobile Force in Turkey, despite a 
49 Catherine Kelleher and Cathleen Fischer, "Germany," in Douglas 1. Murray & Paul R. Viotti, eds., The 
Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1994), pp. 163-164. 
50 Kaiser and Becher, p. 39. 
51 Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?, p. 61. 
52 Kaiser and Becher, p. 43. 
53 Joffe, p. 260. 
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specific Turkish request in the NATO Defense Planning Committee54, because the delay 
hinted that Bonn might not honor its NATO commitment to Turkey in case of an Iraqi 
attack. 55 In this case German diplomacy missed an opportunity to demonstrate open 
solidarity with an ally that was of major strategic importance for NATO during the Cold 
War. Moreover, the debate within Germany and abroad on Bonn's behavior in the 
Turkish case had a much bigger impact on German strategic thinking than appeared at the 
first sight. 
... [It] unleashed not only external criticism but also internal reaction to 
avoid the danger of Germany's isolation. It strengthened the position of 
those political forces who argued in favour of a responsible contribution 
by the unified Germany to multilateral approaches in the field of security 
and international order.56 
The debate about the future of German "out of area" operations in the context of 
constitutional limitations received a strong impetus and it also revealed ambivalent 
attitudes about Germany that still existed in the u.s. 
54 20 December 1990. 
55 See for example Thomas Kielinger and Max Otte, "Germany: The Pressured Power," Foreign Policy 
(Summer 1993). 
56 Kaiser and Becher, p. 50. 
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While some Americans argued that Germany had now out-grown the 
Hitler legacy and could participate in global operations like any other 
country, others still invoked that legacy and used a tone of moral 
superiority in arguing either for or against German involvement. The tone 
as much as the substance of the American debate left many Germans both 
confused and angry, and they especially resented being accused of 
neglecting their loyalty to the United States by failing to send military 
forces after Americans had long told Germans that they should abandon 
their militarist tradition. 57 
Second, the case of the Iraqi missiles caused a lot of trouble for the German 
government. The perception of a German historical guilt and Genscher's visit to Israel on 
24-25 January 1991 "exposed the inherent weakness of a policy of non-involvement 
while it had to face strong accusations concerning Germany's responsibility for the Iraqi 
arms build up."58 It was in a sense the price to be paid for a diplomatic attitude under 
which "passivity" in the international arena turned a handsome profit. Through 
"conciliation rather than confrontation, and trade rather than war"59 the Federal Republic 
tried to offend no one and to be friends with all during the 1970s and 1980s: with Iran 
and Iraq, Israel and the Arabs, the USA and the USSR.60 
57 Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?, p. 62. 
58 Ibid., p. 51. 
59 Joffe, p. 260. 
60 For a complete perspective, it should be recalled that this attitude was an expression of the 
'harmonization need' (Harmonisierungsbedurfnis). Considered one of the hallmarks of the FRG's foreign 
policy, it "may to some extent be characteristic of all modern, liberal industrial states, and particular of 
those 'trading states'-such as Germany and Japan-whose prosperity depends to an unusual degree on 
keeping good relations with a wide range of trading partners." Garton Ash, p. 40. 
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As Richard Smyser has pointed out, it was a moment when, because of the 
German sales of equipment for military purposes to Iraq61, "there would have been a 
major crisis in German American relations if any Iraqi Scud missile had hit Israel with a 
chemical warhead that might have been manufactured with German machinery. "62 
The Yugoslav crisis during 1991 and 1992 raised a different set of problems 
between Bonn and Washington. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, because it happened in 
Europe and not in the Middle East, received, at least in its initial phase, contrasting 
reactions from the two governments. These reactions illustrated how the U.S. and 
Germany might respond differently to European and non-European matters and also 
raised questions about the extent to which the U.S. would be prepared to engage in 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe. 
In 1991 an open split developed between Washington and Bonn. Germany openly 
supported the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In early September 1991, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher declared: "The hour of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia approaches with 
each missile fired by ... cannons and tanks. We cannot witness these events without 
61 Later revelations indicated that German exporters had also supplied Iraq with centrifuges that could 
have been used by the Iraqi government for uranium enrichment and that could have helped Iraq to 
develop and produce atomic bombs. They also suggested that German firms might have sold rocket parts 
and equipment to Iraq. 
62 Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?, p. 63. 
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taking action."63 It was a strong sign that Germany was prepared to recognize Slovenia 
and Croatia if they declared independence. 
This happened after Secretary of State James Baker, despite being informed of 
analyses indicating that the country was about to disintegrate, made a visit in June 1991 
to Belgrade to win assurances that none of the constituent republics would pursue actions 
that would jeopardize Yugoslav unity. The speech that he made on this occasion 
committed the U.S. to Yugoslav unity, at a moment when it was obvious to every one 
that the constituent republics were seething with revolt.64 
At the end of 1991, against the advice of Secretary Baker and of the retiring UN 
Secretary General Xavier Perez de Cuellar, and despite the hard lobbying of the 
American government, Germany pressed the EC to recognize the two states.65 This 
decision brought forth the old arguments about Germany being too "assertive" and even 
aggressive. "When German diplomats met with others to present their views, American 
63 Geoffrey Edwards, "European Responses to the Yugoslav crisis: An Interim Assessment" in Reinhardt 
Rummel, ed., Toward Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European 
Community (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 178. 
64 When the Yugoslav crisis erupted in 1991, both the U.S. National Security Adviser, General Brent 
Scowcroft, and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, were old hands who had served 
in Belgrade (Eagleburger as ambassador) and who later enjoyed consultant relationships with Yugoslav 
authorities and Yugoslav companies. Some observers argue that this may have been one of the reasons 
why the U.S. government, publicly embarrassed by the EC decision of December 1991 and with several of 
its officials accused of financially motivated partisanship, pulled back and let the Europeans--especially the 
Germans--take the lead in trying to deal with the crisis. See, for example, Smyser, Germany and America: 
New Identities, Fateful Rift?, p. 64. 
65 From this moment the U.S. ceased to support Yugoslav integrity and recognized the independence of the 
separate republics, joining the Europeans in April 1992 in also recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it 
generally abstained (at least until 1993) from any attempts to solve or guide developments in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
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newspapers reported that the Germans were exerting 'pressure tactics' and that they were 
'demanding' that others follow their wishes."66 
In conclusion: to the Germans the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis was a 
reminder that genuine threats menace the new Europe and that it might not be feasible to 
rely on the U.S. as often as in the past. Washington, despite its support for Bonn in 
crucial moments, hinted clearly that Germany could not always count on that kind of 
support. Washington officials probably kept in mind for a period the image of their 
defeat when the EC supported Germany against the American advice. 
E. FINAL REMARKS 
During the 1990-1992 period, the German-American relationship offered an 
interesting perspective on post-Cold War era cooperation and coordination between two 
close allies. The German success of reunification was tempered by the sudden awareness 
that others now expect precisely what the Germans are least able to offer at this particular 
time. The American relief regarding the end of the Cold War was overshadowed by the 
fact that old associates are no longer reliable to the same extent as during that 
confrontation. In the new environment, the two governments have not defined and 
understood their remaining common interests. 
66 Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?, p. 66. 
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From being a junior partner, Germany has suddenly become a full partner. Its 
circle of influence and power in Eastern and Western Europe has given Germany an 
authority that has made some of its policies more important than America's.67 
The United States and Germany had not yet learned, at that specific moment, how 
to manage equality. The American government still believed that Germany would and 
even must agree with the United States on all major questions and that Germany would 
support Washington's views. It still regarded Bonn as a junior partner. The German 
government, for its part, showed that it was more ready to take a separate path, but in a 
way, it still regarded itself as a junior partner, although a more independent one. 
The Americans were not prepared to relinquish responsibility; the Germans were 
not yet prepared to accept it. However, it seemed to be evident that neither Washington 
nor Bonn wanted a crisis in German-American relations. In this respect NATO remained 
the organization that strongly supported the transatlantic partnership. The Germans have 
consistently assigned NATO a prominent role in the post-Cold War European security 
architecture. The Alliance remained attractive to the Germans during the 1990-1992 
period because it provided them with a number of positive externalities. 
67 This pushed the U.S. to try to limit German power in the new Europe, by encouraging German 
involvement in NATO and European international organizations, while at the same time working with the 
U.K., France and other countries to constrain German influence in those organizations. 
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First, the stability afforded by the alliance 'reach(es) beyond the 
immediate circle of its member states' and contributes to the stability of 
the reforming nations of Eastem and Central Europe. Second, NATO and 
the NACC provide an institutional mechanism to integrate all the nations 
of Europe into a pan-European security system, reinforcing (and possibly 
usurping) the role of the CSCE. Third, the challenges in NATO strategy 
promise a more secure Germany with a lessened exposure to nuclear war. 
Fourth, NATO serves as a hedge against neo-isolationism in the United 
States.68 
Thus, the most important challenge in the German-American relationship at the 
end ofthe Cold War was to avoid a de facto division oflabor, in which the Americans 
would focus on crises in the Gulf and elsewhere, while Germany would deal with the 
CEE countries and Russia. "This would progressively marginalize the United States in 
Europe and would erode American support for continued engagement in Europe."69 
In this setting, in the post-Cold War environment, Americans, like Europeans, wonder 
how the transatlantic link should now evolve. One must therefore examine the role and 
the attitudes of Americans regarding the "old continent", as one examines the attitudes of 
Europeans. Analyzing the developments in the German-American relationship in the 
1990-1997 period could provide answers for the following questions: 
• How did the fundamental changes that have attended German reunification affect 
the German-American relationship? 
68 Sperling, p. 265. 
69 Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany and America: partners in leadership?" Survival, vol. XXXIII, no. 6, 
(November/December 1991), p. 564. 
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• What have been the implications for the international system, for German and 
American power, and for their shared interests and policies? 
• How might these developments affect the post-1989 emerging European security 
architecture and the future of the transatlantic relationship? 
Furthermore, in the years ahead traditional relationships could change. Europe 
might not feel the previous need for American protection, and America might be tempted 
to follow an isolationist policy. In this context, Germany could insist on the political 
influence to which its military and economic power entitle it and might not be so 
psychologically dependent on American military or French political support. Thus, it 
might decide to become a more autonomous actor. 
In this respect the German and American attitudes towards the following important 
issues on NATO's agenda deserve to be explored: 
• NATO and the ESDI (including NATO's internal adaptation), and 
• NATO and cooperation with former CEE adversaries (the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership 
for Peace, and the process of enlargement). 
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III. GERMAN-AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EUROPEAN 
SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY AND NATO'S INTERNAL 
ADAPTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Among the myriad of complex issues raised by the end of the Cold War in 
Europe, the most confusing and frustrating by far have concerned the elaboration of an 
institutional security system consistent with the continent's evolving strategic 
environment. Before the great changes in Europe began in 1989, things looked rather 
simple. Not only was the Atlantic Alliance the keystone of Western Europe's security 
and defense posture, but it was also the mechanism through which the Western powers 
determined a common policy in the East-West dialogue. Most of all, however, NATO 
was a working decision-making body representing a nucleus of Western European and 
North American states combined under the leadership of the United States. 
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the successful reunification of Germany, 
and the sweeping democratization of Eastern Europe, the Europeans found themselves 
being pulled in different directions by states whose interests often worked at cross-
purposes to each other. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the demise of the 
bipolar system threatened to lift the lid of a Pandora's box of intra-European politics. 
Thus, a relatively tense and uncertain situation was reflected in the debates between the 
advocates of a revitalized NATO, on one side, and the proponents of a new European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), on the other. To the British historian Michael 
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Howard it was clear that "with the evaporation of the threat that called it into existence 
NATO is falling apart, and the rift between the Anglo-Saxon Atlanticists and European 
continentalists grows steadily wider."70 
B. HISTORIC LEGACY 
The historical legacy of this debate could be summarized as follows. The 
integration of Western Europe benefited in the post-war period from u.S. leadership and 
protection. Since the Second World War the U.S. had generally supported the need for 
increased cooperation among European states, including in the area of security. This 
support was the result of conclusions about the latent dangers of European disunity. In 
this respect, it had become an accepted truth in the u.S. that Europe's nationalistic 
fragmentation was at the root of the continent's repeated wars. 
The first attempt to construct a European Defense Community (EDC) was a 
response to U.S. insistence, following the outbreak of the Korean War, for West Germany 
to be rearmed so as to supply military manpower to meet the Soviet threat, thus reducing 
the necessity for large-scale U.S. forces in Europe (1950-1954). The collapse of this 
initiative left two lasting legacies: first, the weak Western European Union (WEU), with 
most of its security functions deliberately transferred to NATO; second, the sense that 
Western Europe could approach political union only indirectly, starting with economic 
and energy policies. 
70 Michael Howard, "Europe's Phoney Warlords," The Times, 29 July 1992. 
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The Fouchet plans, and the French and German challenges to "Anglo-Saxon" 
dominance of the Atlantic Alliance in 1958-1963, left behind a further layer of inhibitions 
and institutions. In 1963 the Franco-German treaty of cooperation (Elysee Treaty) 
attempted to institutionalize a bilateral dialogue between Bonn and Paris in the area of 
defense. But all these projects were ill-fated, the EDC and the Fouchet plans being 
stillborn, and the last premature. 
At the moment when President Kennedy used the expression "European pillar" 
(1962), calling upon Western Europe to share more equitably the "burdensome tasks of 
building and defending a community of free nations,"7! the notion of a European defense 
identity-as opposed to the concept of the defense of Europe-lacked political currency, 
substance, and stated purpose. Furthermore, in the early 1960's, the U.S. sought de facto 
to increase resource contributions from its European allies as individual nations. Far 
from sponsoring collective European burden-sharing, the Americans merely asked for 
greater contributions from each individual ally. 72 
The seventies witnessed the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
III 1970, and the numerous resolutions of the European Parliament and several 
71 Although the pillar metaphor is widely thought to have been contained in President's Kennedy speech, 
there is no explicit reference to it in the text. See "The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership," Department of 
State Bulletin 47 (23 July 1962), pp. 131-133. 
72 The U.S. took the position that the Europeans must do more as they emerged from the devastation of the 
war and re-established strong (and) competitive economies. Especially in the Congress, there seemed to be 
no justification for the U.S. to continue to bear defense burden as it had in the early 1950's. See Charles 
Barry, "ESDI: Toward a Bi-Polar Alliance?," in Charles Barry, ed., Reforging the Trans-Atlantic 
Relationship (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 73. 
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Community reports (from 1973), which began to call for the extension of the cooperative 
concept to defense and security policies. In the language of one of those documents: "In 
practice, cooperation in the field of foreign policy can hardly ever be separated from 
defense and security policy."73 In sum, by the late 1970s Europe's defense identity began 
to acquire political visibility, without having gained any corresponding substance. 
In the same period, as was the case with the ill-fated EDC, the U.S. was both 
supportive and mildly wary of European efforts to coalesce institutionally, first in the 
EUROGROUP initiatives in 1968 and, in a more direct challenge to U.S. dominance in 
the armaments marketplace, in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in 
1976.74 
The 1980s, in the context of a new, more assertive, American foreign policy and a 
parallel worsening of U.S-Soviet relations, witnessed three new initiatives to assert 
Europe's distinctiveness in security and defense policy. First, the French socialist 
government ultimately succeeded in revitalizing the long-dormant Elysee Treaty by 
creating the Franco-German brigade. Moreover, it formalized its bilateral defense 
relations with Spain and Italy. Second, owing again to a French initiative, the WEU was 
reactivated in 1984, not as a decision-making body but as a forum where seven (and later 
ten) European countries might discuss defense and security problems among 
73 European Parliament, Session Documents 1973-74, doc. 12-73, p. 3. As quoted in Michael Fortman and 
David G. Haglund, "Europe, NATO and the ESDI debate: In Quest for Identity," in David G. Haglund, ed., 
From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security after the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993), p. 26. However, Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome has still not been modified. 
74 See NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), pp. 20-22. 
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themselves.75 Third, the debate on security and defense was deepened in the European 
Community. With the signature and ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 
1987, the EC became formally linked to the EPC. Furthermore, the Community 
recognized that it had a legitimate role in the area of defense industrial cooperation. 76 
As new concepts of a distinct European identity grew in the 1980's, the U.S. was 
reassured by the Rome Declaration and Hague Platform 77 documents that the WEU 
would become the European pillar only within and consistent with the NATO alliance. In 
addition, the Americans did not see the potential for a challenge to NATO's exclusive 
role, for other two reasons. First, the Soviet threat guaranteed continuing dependence on 
the strategic U.S. connection. Second, "the U.S. saw little evidence that the new identity 
would have much substance for the foreseeable future. "78 
It can be concluded that until the end of the Cold War the concept of ESDI was 
defined, for a variety of reasons, as a process for the development of some sort of 
convergence of West European security interests within NATO. 
75 With the October 27, 1984, Rome Declaration the WED was reorganized as a "light" structure 
comprising: (1) a council, which meets regularly at the ministerial and ambassadorial level; (2) a staff and 
several working groups, which assist the council; and, (3) a parliamentary assembly that gathers four times 
a year. 
76 See David Owen, "Disarmament, Detente and Deterrence," European Affairs I (Summer 1987), pp. 12-
13. 
77 27 October 1987. 
78 Barry, p. 73. 
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The most prominent of those reasons were to balance American 
predominance, to better promote a policy of detente vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union, and to tie Germany--supposedly vacillating between East and 
West--not only into an Atlantic, but also into a tight political European 
framework. It was a primarily political concept developed by West 
European member states in their search for greater convergence of identity 
of interests while not changing the basic political and military structure of 
the Alliance and Europe. 79 
In this context, at the end of the decade, with the notion of a European defense 
identity taking shape, not as an isolated concept but as a necessary complement to 
Western Europe's desirable political and economic union, more countries became 
progressively more attracted to it. In addition, Europe's security environment was about 
to change drastically, and West Europeans felt emboldened to express their beliefs in the 
emergence of anew, more autonomous, security system for the continent. 
In this environment, the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole and specifically the 
American government had to recognize and adapt to the presence of this increasingly 
popular concept of European security. The post-1989 years witnessed an effort to define 
the ESDI on the basis of the European Union (EU) and the WEU. This has included the 
definition of a new type of relations between NATO and the WEU and, thus, three 
countries became strongly involved in this process: France, Germany, and the United 
States. 
79 Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: A German Analysis," in Ch. Barry, Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 37. 
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To understand ESDI's true character, and further the German and American 
attitudes towards it, it is essential to examine, at a minimum, the following principal 
manifestations8o--which are all intergovernmental: 
• The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the WEU, and the 
Eurocorps; 
• NATO's 1994 Brussels Summit and the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) 
Concept; and, 
• The 1995-1997 Developments. 
c. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 
Since the London Declaration in July 1990, the Alliance has repeatedly called 
upon the allies "to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members." 
Furthermore, it has welcomed the "efforts of the EC to strengthen the security dimension 
in the process of European integration and recognized the significance of the progress 
made by the EC countries towards the goal of a political union, including the 
development ofa common defense and security policy."8! 
The Europeans took the initiative and, thus, the Treaty on European Union, 
finalized at the European Council meeting in Maastricht on 9-10 December 1991 and 
signed on 7 February 1992, declared as one of its first objectives "the implementation of a 
80 A complete analysis would include also the debate concerning the common defense policy and the 
cooperation in the field of the armaments industries. 
81 "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 5-6 July 1990," NATO Review 38 
(August 1990), pp. 32-33. 
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common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence 
policy, which might in time led to common defence."82 The Treaty further requested 
WEU (which it referred to as "an integral part of the development of the Union") "to 
elaborate and implement decisions on actions of the Union which have defense 
implications. "83 
In two "Declarations" attached to the Treaty, the nine nations that were then WEU 
members stated their aim "to develop the WEU as the defense component of the 
European Union and as [a] means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance."84 Simultaneously, states which were members of the European Union and 
not, at that time, members of the WEU85 were invited to accede to the WEU86 and the 
WEU proposed that other European member-states of NAT087 become associate 
members of the WEU in a way that would give them the possibility of "participating 
fully" in its activities. 88 
82 Article B, Title I of Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992. Available [On line]: 
[http://europa.eu.intlen/recordlmt/title1.html]. [10 February 1998]. The signing took place some eight 
weeks later because of the need to consolidate and translate the text properly. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Treaty on European Union, Final Act, Declaration on Western European Union, Declaration I, par. 1. 
Available [On line]: [http://europa.eu.inlen/record/mtlfinal.html]. [10 February 1998]. 
85 Greece, Denmark, and Ireland. 
86 Treaty on European Union, Declaration II. 
87 Turkey, Norway, and Iceland. 
88 Treaty on European Union, Declaration II. 
44 
The Maastricht Treaty was the outcome of fierce debates and battles within and 
among states, and the section dealing with the CFSP, which is riddled with ambiguous 
language and concepts, reflected the lack of consensus on Europe's future role. It was 
clear that the twelve had not taken a significant qualitative step towards a common, 
integrated European policy on foreign and security matters. But the important 
contribution of the Treaty has been that the member countries of the Union started to 
work together in a tighter and more coordinated framework on CFSP matters. 
At the same time it may be well that Maastricht has marked a crucial shift in 
Western defense, from U.s. leadership within an integrated Atlantic Alliance towards an 
integrated West European pillar within NATO and towards an independent ESDI 
dimension.89 Thus, it is important to understand the motivations of the main protagonists 
(especially Germany and France) and the American perspective on this important event. 
In the negotiations, as during many previous attempts to define Western Europe's 
international identity, "France and Britain represented initially opposing positions, with 
the U.s. an outsider and Germany attempting to hold close to France without losing touch 
with the others. "90 
Specifically, the French retained their traditional suspicion of NATO, the 
integrated military structure and the institutionalized U.S. leadership within it. The 
Federal Republic of Germany shared not only the Atlanticism of some European capitals 
89 However, only the broadest outlines of such a pillar were defined at Maastricht. 
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(such as London and The Hague), but also the French pro-European declaratory policy. 
Bonn wanted to reassure all its allies that "Germany was anchored firmly in the western 
community, as the process of unification was completed, as Soviet acquiescence was 
gained and as new links with the former socialist states were made."91 In the German 
perception, a closer ED legitimized the pursuit of German aims in Central and Eastern 
Europe.92 Neither the French nor the German government had an entirely coherent 
position throughout the interconnected negotiations of 1990-1991. 
At the same time, from the German viewpoint, certain factors promoted the 
development and implementation of an ESDI. First, in the context of German 
unification, strengthening and enlarging cooperation within a West European structure93 
would lock Germany into tight security framework. Second, the future direction of u.S. 
policy towards Europe after the end of the Cold War did not appear to be outlined 
clearly.94 Europeans wanted to be prepared for a possible American withdrawal from 
90 Anand Menon, Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "A common European defence?," Survival, vol. 
34, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 104. 
91 A. Menon, A. Forster and W. Wallace, p. 105. 
92 If a decision was to be forced, Paris was more important to Bonn than London, because France was the 
preferred (if difficult) partner with which Germany had worked closely for more than 30 years. However, 
Washington was as important as Paris, because the United States offered a special relationship for global 
economic cooperation, as weB as for European security. Ibid., pp. 105-112. 
93 This was seen, at that time, as the only real alternative to NATO. 
94 Some speculated that the United States might adopt a Pacific orientation or domestic policy as its 
priority. For a complete analysis of the impact of the possible U.S. orientation toward the Pacific on the 
transatlantic relationship, see Robert O'Brien, "Manifest Destiny and the Pacific Century: Europe as No. 
3," in Jarod Wiener, ed., The Transatlantic Relationship (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 95-127. 
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Europe. Third, Russia remained Germany's main security concern in Europe. Russia's 
view of NATO was always more critical than its view of the EU and ESDI. In the new 
European context, Western Europe could aim at balancing Russian and Western 
(implicitly German) interests.95 
In this context, the Maastricht Treaty "has been approved by an overwhelming 
majority in the Bundestag, and no major political party has voiced substantial objections 
against a further strengthening of the EU, even in the field of foreign [, security and 
defense] policy. "96 The belief that a Germany more integrated into Europe could balance 
also the Euro-Atlantic disputes-especially by continuing its role as a mediator between 
France and the U.S.-was prominent in Germany's post-Cold War political arena. 
The United States position had similar inconsistencies. Repeated support 
for a stronger West European role within the Atlantic Alliance was 
matched by warnings about the adverse impact of moves towards a 
European caucus on America's European commitment. Bilateral tours of 
prominent U.S. officials cautioned European governments against any 
practical steps towards a separate European Defense identity. The U.S. 
administration communicated its views more directly to a WEU 
ministerial meeting in February 1991, through the so-called "Bartholomew 
Telegram," laying down U.S. preconditions for a European Defense 
Identity--although some officials were evidently embarrassed by such a 
peremptory intervention in the European debate.97 
95 Schmidt, pp. 38-40. 
96 Ibid., p. 52. 
97 Menon, Forster and Wallace, p. 105. 
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Preceding the Maastricht Treaty provisions, the most significant of the Franco-
German initiatives on the European defense identity was the Kohl-Mitterrand proposal of 
October 14, 1991. Its purpose was to develop the existing Franco-German brigade into a 
complete European army corps.98 The Eurocorps plan reflected the willingness of France 
and Germany to move ahead of their partners in the EC, with the hope of subsequently 
drawing those partners in their wake. This proposal was a direct challenge to the NATO 
Rapid Reaction Corps99 and stimulated a debate about the WED's role between NATO 
and the EU .100 
The NATO summit in Rome on 7-8 November 1991 brought some of these 
disagreements to a head. The U.S. was irritated by the different signals coming from 
European capitals. President Bush was reported to have said, "if your ultimate goal is to 
provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today."101 
Furthermore, some U.S. officials arrived "enraged" by apparent French encouragement 
98 The original proposal was, in fact, no more than a two-line footnote at the end of a long letter on 
political union, but it soon took on larger proportions. The text can be found reprinted in Europa Archiv, 
vo1.46, no. 22 (1991), pp. 571-574. The text called for expanding the joint brigade into "the basis for a 
European corps, to which the armed forces of other WEU member-states could be added." 
99 The ministerial meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee on 28-29 May 1991 agreed on and 
announced a NATO command structure review, which involved the creation of the multinational Rapid 
Reaction Corps for ACE, under British command. This multinational corps brought together British, 
Dutch, Belgian, and German troops. 
100 Britain wanted agreement on a statement setting the future role of the WEU and its links with the EU 
before the Maastricht summit; France wanted the grandes /ignes alone to be outlined. Germany was 
generally supportive of the French position. 
101 Robert Mauthner and Lionel Barber, "Bush calls on Europe to clarify role in NATO," Financial Times, 
8 November 1991. 
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for the "development of alternative structures to NATO, interpreting this as a sign that 
Paris hoped and believed that the United States would soon leave Europe."102 
The German delegation at the summit was relatively silent. This silence reflected 
the inherent tensions in Bonn's position; it wanted to retain a central role for the United 
States and NATO, while at the same time it wanted to cooperate with France in plans for 
a stronger European defense identity. 103 At the summit, Chancellor Kohl had 
[S]toutly defended the Franco-German proposals, hinting that Washington 
had been kept fully informed about these plans from an early stage, and 
affirmed his commitment both to the continuance of NATO and to the 
evolution of a common European security policy. 104 
The attitudes of the Europeans discussed above throw light on some of the 
obstacles that have hampered progress towards ESDI. First, any positive development 
towards ESDI inevitably raises difficult questions concerning the responsibilities of 
Europe's existing security institutions. 
Before Europe can establish itself as an effective actor in international politics, the 
respective roles of the EU, the WEU, and NATO should be clarified. This argument 
would be inevitably linked with the possible risk of "regionalization" of European 
security, in the context of the simultaneous processes of "deepening" and "widening" the 
1 02 Information from European participants at the NATO summit, as presented in A. Menon, A. Forster 
and W. Wallace, p. Ill. 
103 The Franco-German letter of 14 October 1991 had specifically identified political and economic 
relations with the former members ofthe Warsaw Pact as a priority area for the CFSP of the EU. 
104 A. Menon, A. Forster and W. Wallace, p. 112. 
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EU-that is, strengthening the ED's supranational institutions and an ESDI and CFSP 
while enlarging the EU. Last, but not least, the problem of resource allocation for the 
establishment of the autonomous defense structure would be another issue to be solved by 
the Europeans. 
In this context, the WEU is playing the role of a passe-partout in European 
security and defense affairs: it could be considered both the possible defense arm of the 
EU and the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. Taking into account the fact that 
the WEU does not possess many assets that could be used as a framework for developing 
an ESDI, its role in crisis management and peace operations deserves analysis. 
D. WEU AND THE EUROCORPS 
With the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU has become an integral part of the West 
European integration process. The WEU has been designated the ED's organization of 
choice to formulate and implement defense and military aspects of policy. Although the 
WEU maintains its independent legal basis (the 1948 Brussels Treaty, as modified in 
1954) for the Union's CFSP to be effective, close cooperation between the EU and WEU 
is indispensable: this might eventually result in the amalgamation of both organizations. 
Only six months after the Maastricht Treaty had been signed, WEU member states 
adopted the Petersberg Declaration (19 June 1992)105, which clarified the WED's role in 
105 At Petersberg some reduction in the inefficient duplication of European defense agencies was within 
sight, with agreement to examine "the role and functions ofa possible European Annaments Agency," to 
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conflict prevention and crisis management. The ministers of foreign affairs of the WEU 
member countries agreed that, besides making a contribution to collective defense in 
accordance with the treaties of Brussels and Washington, military units of the member 
states of the WEU could be deployed for "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping 
tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."106 
Deployment could take place on the basis of a mandate from the CSCE or the 
United Nations Security Council. In order to implement the decisions, a Planning Cell 
was set up in early 1993 in the WEU headquarters in Brussels. 107 "With these Petersberg 
tasks the WEU was a step ahead of NATO since peace enforcing could be carried out by 
the WEU, but not by NATO."108 
The new Franco-German "Eurocorps" which was announced on 22 May 1992109 
would be excellent for carrying out the Petersberg tasks. This new army concept was 
consistent with the decision of the Alliance Strategic Concept that 
merge the IEPG into an enlarged WEU, and to transfer some or all ofthe EUROGROUP's remaining 
functions as well. 
106 WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration. Bonn, 19 June 1992, chapter 2, sect. 4. 
107 About 40 officers perform currently at the Planning Cell. 
108 Rob de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battlefor Consensus (London and 
Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1997), p. 56. 
109 At the May 1992 Franco-German summit in La Rochelle, the Common Defense and Security Council 
decided on the implementation of the measures necessary for the creation of the Eurocorps. The corps' 
missions were also officially announced: (1) the defense of West em Europe in the context of Article 5 of 
the NATO and WEU treaties; (2) peacekeeping and peacemaking; and (3) humanitarian tasks. See 
"Summit of the French-German Defense and Security Council on 22 May 1992 in La Rochelle," press 
release provided by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington, D.C., 26 May 1992. 
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[I]ntegrated and multinational European structures, as they are further 
developed in the context of an emerging European Defense Identity, will 
also increasingly have a similar role to play in enhancing the allies' ability 
to work together in the common defense. I 10 
The United States was at best ambivalent toward the Eurocorps proposal. The Pentagon 
(often more relaxed toward European initiatives than the State Department) was generally 
supportive of the Franco-German initiative. I I I The Administration generally saw it as 
needless at best and at worst potentially damaging to the North Atlantic Alliance. I 12 
One of the most difficult and controversial aspects of the corps has been its 
relationship with NATO and its integrated commands, a question that produced 
differences not only between the corps' Franco-German sponsors and their allies, but 
between the French and the Germans themselves. Whereas Germany (all of whose troops 
are assigned to NATO anyway) wanted a close NATO link, France (whose forces are not 
integrated in the commands) had reservations. NATO leaders such as SACEUR John 
Galvin argued that independent European structures would create force redundancies, 
110 North Atlantic Council (Heads of State and Government), The Alliance's New Strategic Concept. 
Rome, 7-8 November 1991, par. 52. 
IllSecretary of Defense Dick Cheney called the proposal "basically sound." The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, suggested that European units like the corps would be "politically 
and militarily well equipped to deal with interregional crises, humanitarian missions and peacekeeping." 
NATO SACEUR John Galvin, while expressing some misgivings about command structures, urged 
Congress to support the Eurocorps because "we want the Europeans to grow stronger without loosening 
their Atlantic ties." See Scott A. Harris and James B. Steinberg, European Defense and the Future of 
Transatlantic Relations, MR-276 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1993) and The Franco-German 
Corps and the Future of European Security: Implications for u.s. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Foreign 
Policy Institute Policy Consensus Report, June 1992). 
112 Ibid. 
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cause confusion in command structures, and complicate military planning. I 13 Germany 
was caught in a familiar position of trying to placate both Washington and Paris and often 
found itself making somewhat contradictory promises to both sides on the "priority" of 
the corps' forces. II4 This was one of the many instances of Germany trying to find 
middle ground between the French and American positions. 
From the French perspective the Eurocorps would represent the first step toward 
truly independent European capacities for scenarios in which the u.s. would be unable or 
unwilling to act, and function as a means to influence more heavily the decisions of the 
u.s. when it did act.1l5 The corps would be the basis for a future European army with 
autonomous capabilities for defense within Europe, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks, 
and force proj ection abroad. I 16 It should also be recalled that numerous French leaders 
(for instance, Mitterrand and Rocard) have claimed to be uncertain whether the 
Americans would remain in Europe and whether they would be as prepared in the future 
to provide leadership in dealing with European security challenges as they had been 
during the Cold War. 
113 See William Drozdiak, "France, Gennany Unveil Corps as a Step Toward European Defense," 
Washington Post, 23 May 1992. 
114 See, for example, the Gennan agreement at La Rochelle that the new units would be given assigned 
"as a priority" to the Eurocorps, and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's assurance to U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker in Lisbon one week later that NATO would have first rights. (" Das erste Zugriffrecht hat die 
NATO," Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 May 1992). 
115Gordon, p. 44. 
116 Ibid. 
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The German conception emphasized the Eurocorps' role in organizing a better 
European contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and in drawing France closer to NATO. 
German officials repeatedly stated that they could not imagine the Eurocorps ever acting 
without the United States and often described it as a "second best" solution to full Euro-
Atlantic integration. As one German diplomat put it: "We would have preferred that 
France simply reintegrate within NATO and that NATO serve as West's primary security 
organization. But the French aren't willing to do that, so we took the next best thing." 117 
Another opinion was that 
Creating common instruments (such as the Eurocorps) without ensuring a 
common foreign, security, and defense policy that such instruments would 
have to serve, is not without risk. It could well lead to disappointment 
when it becomes clear that common instruments could not be used in a 
given situation where no commonality in interest does exist. I IS 
Despite these risks and constraints (including the CFE Treaty) multinationality 
became an increasingly important concept for the Germans. I 19 It was to be used to tie as 
many units as possible into the defense of the national territory and to "broadcast the 
117 Interviews conducted by Philip Gordon with a German diplomat in Washington, D.C., May 1992. As 
quoted in Gordon, p. 44. 
118 Holger M. Mey, "View from Germany: A European Security and Defense Identity--What Role for the 
United States?," Comparative Strategy, vol. 14, no. 3 (July-September 1995), p. 313. A typical example 
could be different perceptions by France and Germany regarding operations in the former French colonies 
in Africa. 
119 Germany immediately joined the ARRC (1991) and also developed other similar military bilateral 
arrangements with the Netherlands, Denmark and the United States. 
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message that [Germany] was not aiming at solo initiatives in Europe."120 Moreover, the 
acceptance of a military unit with international peacekeeping and peacemaking as 
declared missions represented a new commitment to play an international security role 
and to do so in the multilateral context. I21 However, as Guillaume Parmentier has 
pointed out, 
Germany remains marked by an extremely territorial conception of its 
defence, as reflected by its strong resistance to France's discreet requests 
aimed at encouraging the Eurocorps to move towards greater flexibility 
and inter-army capabilities and hence to its adaptation to selective light 
operations. 122 
Initially, several West European governments were skeptical about the benefits of 
the Eurocorps, which could be seen as an unproductive duplication of military 
cooperation that was already taking place in NATO. Much of the doubt was taken away 
by the so-called SACEUR agreement of January 1993, which stipulated that the 
Eurocorps would be deployed within NATO in case of war in Europe, and that it could be 
also used by NATO for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. I23 In practice this 
120 de Wijk, p. 44. 
121 This was one of the major requests of the Bush administration Germany immediately after the 
breakdown of the Berlin Wall. 
122 The word "projection" is not in the Germans' military vocabulary. See Guillaume Parmentier, 
"Painstaking Adaptation to the New Europe: French and German Defence Policies in 1997," France and 
Japan in a Changing Security Environment, 23-24 June 1997, The Japan Institute ofIntemational Affairs, 
Tokyo, Cahiers de L'IFRl, no. 21., p. 28. 
123 See Karl Fe1dmayer, "Einbindung des deutsch-franzosischen Korps in das atlantische Bundnis," 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 December 1992. 
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implied that the French troops of the Eurocorps would be subordinated to the SACEUR 
in a case of Article 5 engagement (i.e., in the case of war). 124 
Owing to its limited operational military capabilities, the Eurocorps today 
primarily serves as a political signal and will perhaps, in due course, offer an institutional 
model for closer military cooperation between WEU member states. In the long run, 
considered as a contribution to the development of an ESDI, it could create-as many 
American officials fear and as many French officials explicitly seek-a European 
"caucus" that would make it difficult for the United States to influence European 
decisions once they are taken. 
E. THE 1994 BRUSSELS SUMMIT AND CJTF 
At the same time, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was escalating, and it was 
impossible for the West Europeans to find an effective answer on their own. NATO's 
position was not much better. After the 1991 Rome summit the Alliance "seemed to 
lapse into permanent confusion"125 as to which course to follow. The years 1992 and 
1993 witnessed some steps towards NATO's adaptation to the new challenges. 126 The 
124 The Eurocorps represents the first French acceptance of multinational military integration since 1966, 
allows for the first peaceful permanent stationing ever of German soldiers on French soil, and provides a 
legal means for the continued presence of French troops in Germany. 
125 de Wijk, p. 71. 
126 In June and December 1992, NATO declared its willingness to engage in peacekeeping missions under 
UN and CSCE mandates, and 1993 witnessed strong preparations for the important initiatives to be 
announced in October 1993 in Travemunde. 
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profound differences of opinion among the allies were about practical action outside the 
treaty area and Article 5; countries such as Germany, Denmark and Belgium articulated 
reservations. "This was expressed in the difficulty which these countries had in 
recognizing that the Alliance was playing an increasingly visible role in former 
Yugoslavia. "127 
In this context, the German Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, sounded an alarm at 
the end of 1993. He called for reform of NATO since "we cannot just confine ourselves 
to reconfirming the Alliance's basic mission in the past."l28 This was followed by a plea 
for an Alliance that could undertake an active role outside the treaty area, and for "force 
and command structures" which reflected this. 
Moreover, this function would require closer co-operation within the NACC and 
the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The 
WEU would have to take on the defense aspects of this policy and, in conformity with the 
Maastricht Treaty, develop into the European pillar ofNATO.I29 
127 de Wijk, p. 72. For Gennany there was also a political constitutional taboo on the deployment of 
forces outside the NATO area, although this did not mean that Gennany did not see a role for NATO 
outside the treaty area. It was not until July 1994 that the Constitutional court in Karlsruhe clarified the 
restrictions in the Basic Law about possible Gennan participation in military operations other than self-
defense against external aggression and indicated that the Federal Parliament may approve Gennan 
participation in internationally sanctioned "collective security" operations. 
128 Volker Ruehe, "Adapting the Alliance in the Face of Great Challenges," NATO Review, December 
1993, pp. 3-5. 
129 de Wijk, p. 72. 
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In May 1993 Senators Bob Dole and Richard Lugar voiced their discontent with 
President Clinton's NATO policies, putting pressure on the administration to find a 
solution to the impasse. At the Spring Session of the North Atlantic Assembly they 
complained about NATO's impotence and failure to take action in former Yugoslavia: 
The inability of NATO to act effectively is bound to raise grave doubts 
among both the American people and the Congress about whether the 
enormous yearly investment we make in NATO is reaping sufficient 
benefits. 130 
In this context, President Clinton advanced in June 1993 the proposal of 
organizing a NATO summit later in the year. "The summit was intended to confirm the 
continuing relevance of NATO as a European security organization and the American 
commitment to Europe." 131 
The important steps III preparation for the summit were the "brainstorming 
sessions" of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) during July-September 1993 and the 
informal meeting of ministers of defense which took place in Travemunde at the 
invitation ofthe German defense minister from 19 to 21 October 1993. 
During the "brainstorming sessions," among other issues, the relationship between 
NATO and the WEU was of particular concern. Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
and the new u.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador 
130 North Atlantic Assembly, European and Transatlantic Security in a Revolutionary Age, Sect. 27. As 
quoted in de Wijk, p. 73. 
131 de Wijk, p. 73. 
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Robert Hunter, had insisted that "there must be separable but not separate capabilities," 
but it was not very clear what the Americans meant by it. A second American proposal 
concerned an increase in the effectiveness of NATO in crisis management in Europe and, 
thus, an adjustment of the command and force structures would be required in order to 
make NATO a more efficient instrument for dealing with "Bosnia type" crises. Finally, 
the Americans insisted on a greater European role in crisis management outside the 
NATO area. This implied that the NATO command structure would become more 
European and that it could also be used for carrying out missions under the flag of the 
WEU.132 
At Travemunde, Les Aspin, the American Secretary of Defense, presented the 
U.S. proposal to make the force and command structures better suited for out-of-area 
operations. This proposal was known as "the combined joint task force concept" 
(CJTF)133 and "has been developed in secret in consultation with SACEUR and was 
intended for carrying out peacekeeping and other operations by NATO and WEU."134 
The basic assumption was that the integrated command structure was still at the moment 
completely geared to Article 5 operations but was, in principle, flexible enough to carry 
out other missions. 
132 Ibid., p. 74. 
133 Combined and joint indicated multinational, multiservice operations in one operational unit executed 
by several countries' forces. 
134 de Wijk, p. 76. 
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The idea was that SACEUR would commission the Major Subordinate 
Commanders to form central staff within their headquarters to carry out these 
operations. 135 In the event of a crisis the CJTF would be activated and supplemented 
with specialized personnel. The CJTF would hold periodical exercises, especially in the 
field of peacekeeping. Finally, the CJTF should form the basis for the "separable but not 
separate" forces of a European security and defense identity. 136 
With these preparations among others, the summit took place on 10 and 11 
January 1994 in Brussels. The heads of states and government approved three important 
documents of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the CJTF concept on the first day. 
Besides the approval of these documents several decisions were taken which would 
significantly influence NATO's agenda in the coming years. 
First, it was decided that active support should be given to the development of the 
ESDI as a European pillar within NATO. In the statement, support was given to the 
WEU, as the embodiment of the European pillar within NATO. An important 
contribution was the commitment that NATO was 
135 AFNORTHWEST, AFCENT and AFSOUTH. 
l36 de Wijk, p. 76. 
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. " ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of 
consultations in the North Atlantic Council for WEU operations 
undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not 
separate capabilities that could respond to European requirements and 
contribute to Alliance security. 137 
This approach could avoid a costly duplication of military capacities within the WEU. 
Second, the decision to develop further functions outside the NATO area was 
taken. This required immediately the revision of the "command and force structures," 
with a view to better co-operation with the WEU and the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC). The ambassadors were commissioned, with the advice of the Military 
Authorities, 
to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and 
procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently 
and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping as well as to 
improve co-operation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European 
Security and Defense Identity. As part of the process we endorse the 
CJTF concept as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including 
operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. 138 
The conspicuous interest of Germany in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe, 
led Bonn to support the effort to create CJTFs, because CJTFs might give the WEU an 
increased role in possible operations in the region. 139 
l37 North Atlantic Council (Heads of State and Government), Declaration, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, 
Sect. 6. 
l38 Brussels Declaration, Sect. 9. 
l39 Schmidt., pp. 52-55. 
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This idea is emphasized also in the 1994 German White" Paper on Defense: 
.. .In the future, it [the WEU] will be able to fall back on NATO structures 
and forces. This will render Europe capable of taking strategic action and 
at the same time prevent the building of dual structures that no one is able 
and willing to afford I 40 .... This new command structure must also be 
assured for European ends. The WEU must have the opportunity to use 
these headquarters. 141 
It can be concluded that, in January 1994, NATO leaders approved an initiative to 
give the Alliance's decades-old integrated military structure strikingly different 
capabilities for the future. Because the range of the decisions taken was much greater 
than was the case in Rome, the Brussels summit could be described as "without doubt the 
most important NATO meeting held in recent decades."142 
F. THE 1995-1997 DEVELOPMENTS 
The 1994 Brussels summit established the CJTF concept as the key instrument for 
updating the Alliance's military structures in order to deal more efficiently with non-
Article 5 missions and to support ESDI's development. Although the term CJTF denotes 
a multinational, multiservice task force, the heart of the concept entails creating in 
advance a combined structure with staff, procedures and planning, so that a group of 
140 White Paper on the Security o/the Federal Republic o/Germany and the Situation and Future o/the 
Bundeswehr, 1994 (Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn), chapter 4, sect. 426, p. 54. 
141 Ibid, Sect. 438, p. 57. 
142 de Wijk, p. 80. 
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countries responding to a non-Article 5 crisis could use assets according to the particular 
need. 143 
"u.s. defense officials conceived CJTF as a means both to further adapt NATO's 
military structure to post-Cold War missions and to support ESDI by making NATO 
assets available to a WEU military operation."144 CJTF intervention would essentially 
take place either under NATO command, if the U.S. were a major player, or under that of 
the WEU for distinctly European operations. Overall, it would allow for more effective 
sharing of global military burdens between the United States and Europe and pave the 
way for the WEU to conduct missions in which the Americans had little or no direct 
interest or involvement. 145 
However, efforts to implement CJTF have been the object of considerable 
frustration. Significant differences emerged between the U.S. and France on how to set 
up both NATO- and WEU-Ied CJTFs. "Whereas the US wanted to use CJTF to give 
NATO's IMS [International Military Staff] the flexibility to respond to non-Article 5 
missions, the French argued that the IMS is inherently unsuited for those type of 
143 For a detailed analysis of the CJTF, see Charles Barry, "Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and 
Practice," in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance, 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), pp. 203-220. 
144 Robert Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO," in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO's 
Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 1997), p. 62. 
145 In addition, it could accommodate participation by forces from non-NATO counties, especially CEE 
countries, in the framework ofPFP cooperation. 
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missions."146 The French in particular resisted extending the existing American-led 
major NATO commands--especially Allied Command Europe--to non-Article 5 missions. 
They worried that this extension would effectively mean American political control over 
the mission. As a consequence they leaned heavily in the direction of European 
structures for non-Article 5 missions. For its part the U.S. was particularly concerned 
about the use of NATO assets in European-led CJTF missions in which the Americans 
did not participate. 147 
The French position toward NATO began to change under the leadership of 
President Jacques Chirac. On 5 December 1995, France announced its decision to return 
to the Military Committee (MC), from which it had withdrawn in 1966, and to participate 
in deliberations about NATO reform. France's decision, which represented a 
reorientation in its relations with the Alliance, "was warmly welcomed by the German 
leaders and the German defense community."148 Despite the rapprochement with the 
Alliance, the French have continued their efforts to merge the WEU into the EU. The 
146 Grant, p. 63. 
147 Ibid., pp. 64-65. The American position in 1995 reflected views at the time when, in the context of the 
Yugoslav crisis, in Republican circles particularly, voices (such as Newt Gingrich, the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives) were arguing that European problems require European solutions, certainly 
when American interests were not at issue in the crisis. 
148 Parmentier, p. 30. 
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Germans supported them. Chancellor Kohl in particular wanted to push forward the 
"proud and symbolic European phalanx."149 
Thus, when the French and the Germans met with other European ministers at a 
seminar at Freiburg, on 27 February 1996, they "arrived at a compromise alternative to 
Germany's early proposals for the extension of majority voting to CFSP deliberations of 
the European Council."150 The adopted proposal for "constructive abstention"151 should 
provide, in the medium term, the framework under which the WEU could merge into the 
EU. But, taking into account the strictly Atlanticist conceptions of the German military 
and those of the majority of the German diplomats and politicians in politico-military 
matters,152 each Franco-German initiative must be "corrected" by a gesture toward 
NATO. On 19 March 1996, Werner Hoyer, Parliamentary State Secretary in the German 
Foreign Ministry, signaled immediately the extent to which the French and German 
conceptions on European defense still diverge: 
149 International Security Review 1997, published by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
Studies (Whitehall, London, 1997), p. 5. 
150 Ibid., p. 9. 
151 The proposal envisaged that: (1) No EU member state will be obliged to provide national forces for 
multinational European military and police actions against its will; (2) Any member state that felt unable to 
take part in such multinational European action will be unable to hinder the others. The abstaining country 
will be expected to show solidarity with other EU states through political support for this majority-
approved European action and by means of financial contributions through the EU budget. In the 
meantime the Council of Ministers should have the competence to decide on CFSP actions which the WEU 
is to carry out on behalf ofthe EU. Ibid., p. 5. 
152 Parmentier, p. 30. 
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We clearly reject the [French] ideas that would end [up by] replacing 
NATO's integrated command structure and [we] will speak out against 
every measure that could give the impression of driving a wedge into the 
transatlantic relationship.I53 
Inside the Alliance the differences between the Americans and the French 
concerning the implementation of the CJTF concept were overcome. 154 The NAC was 
designated to steer CJTF operations politically and the operation itself would be guided 
by the newly established Capabilities Co-ordination Cell, under the MC and within the 
IMS. Despite some notable unanswered questions,155 the acceptance of the political 
CJTF could be considered as an important element in the restructuring of NATO's 
integrated military structure.l 56 German officials were supportive of this process and 
remained sincerely attached to a form of Europeanization of NATO, but the reflex of 
resisting strong u.s. pressure maintained their "dual-track" approach in the Franco-
American debate. They looked forward with optimism to the important June 1996 NAC, 
which was to be held in Berlin. In the words of Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign 
Minister: 
1531nternational Security Review J 997, p. 7. The remarks were made in the context of the French 
statements in January 1996 that requested: the changing of the term "European pillar" to "ESDI," that a 
European Deputy SACEUR should lead all European operations, and the creation of a single military 
structure for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. See de Wijk, pp. 122-125. 
154 These included differences of opinion concerning political control over military forces and the forums 
that would steer the CJTF operations. 
155 These included the role that the NATO Major Commanders, SACLANT and SACEUR, would be able 
to play in CJTF operations, the conditions under which the WEU could make use of CJTF and NATO 
assets and which headquarters would receive CJTF nuclei. 
156 de Wijk, pp. 126-128. 
66 
Therefore [they] welcome the fact that the links between NATO and the 
WEU have increasingly been strengthened on the basis of the agreed 
principles of complementarity and transparency. NATO will support the 
WEU in developing its operational capabilities, but this must not lead to a 
duplication of structures and bureaucratic procedures if only for reasons of 
efficiency and cost. The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) 
is the key to this. Here, too, Berlin must set the course for the future. 157 
The decisions taken by the ministerial NATO Council on 3 June 1996 concerned 
basic political requirements for the adaptation of the Alliance. The final communique 
contained three important points, under which the Allies agreed to several practical 
arrangements in support of ESDI, but avoided dispositions that might have led to a split 
within the Alliance. It is important to mention that during the negotiations concerning 
the "most European" communique of all NAC meetings, "none of the member states had 
clear-cut ideas about the European Security and Defense Identity and the precise 
relationship between the European Union, the WEU and NATO."158 
The first of these concerned the maintenance of the Alliance's military 
effectiveness, both for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. These tasks should be 
carried out by a single multinational command structure in which the European element 
would predominate and which would facilitate participation by the PFP partners and 
other non-NATO countries. The CJTF element should be the key concept in this. The 
second basic principle was the maintenance of the transatlantic link. NATO should 
157 Klaus Kinkel, "Prospects for the Berlin Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in June," NATO 
Review, Webedition, no. 3 (May 1996), pp. 8-12. Available [On line]: 
[http://www.nato.intldocu/review/articles/9603-2.htm]. [10 January 1998]. 
158 de Wijk, p. 132. A small step was taken on 6 June 1996 when the WEU-NATO Security Agreement 
came into force and classified NATO documents were made available to the WEU. 
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remain the principal forum for transatlantic consultations and the instrument through 
which common interests were promoted. The third point was the promotion of the 
ESDI.l59 
From the American viewpoint, the 1996 Berlin NAC meeting concluded that, in 
the words of Walter Slocombe, the u.s. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy: 
In the future, part of NATO's peacetime responsibilities must include 
preparing for such assistance, in planning, exercises, training and staffing, 
for WEU-Ied operations. All of this should be done within the Alliance 
and within its military command structure, not as a separate (including de 
facto separate) parallel structure, or by elements that are 'European only, 
American clean.' It is essential from the u.s. point of view not to foster a 
bifurcated NATO, in which de facto if not explicitly, there are two 
systems, one for the U.S. and Article 5, and one for Europe and non-
Article 5 operations. 160 
Thus, at the June 1996 Berlin meeting of NATO foreign ministers, successful 
steps were taken to develop a model for accommodating the intra-European and 
transatlantic aspects of Europe's defense identity. Some differences were papered over 
regarding how independently European forces might operate from NATO oversight while 
using Alliance resources; and much would depend upon how agreed-upon arrangements 
function in practice. 
Despite some divergent positions, it can be appreciated that the June 1996 Berlin 
NAC meeting was 
159 See North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, 3 June 1996, par. 5-9. 
160 Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Remarks to the Atlantic Council, 14 June 
1996. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
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A turning point in the debate on NATO's internal adaptation, because it 
reconciled the Alliance-wide desire for more flexible, mobile forces that 
could be deployed for the full range of Alliance missions--from collective 
defence to crisis management and peace-keeping--with the aspiration of 
those Allies in the European Union to develop a tangible, credible 
European Security and Defence Identity. 161 
A few days later, on 13 June 1996, the ministers of defense of the NATO member 
countries met in Brussels for the spring meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and 
the Nuclear Planning Group. During the discussions, the Germans pressed for strong 
political guidelines concerning the reform of NATO's command structure, while the 
Americans reportedly felt that too many concessions had already been made to support 
the WEU. The U.S. also opposed a proposal to direct planning specifically toward the 
WEU's Petersberg tasks. 162 Despite the fact that Germany felt that CJTF "would 
provide, if properly used by the Europeans, sufficient opportunity for the expression of 
European identity on the military level,"163 the Germans considered, together with the 
French, that "'the Berlin signal well and truly represented the founding act of European 
identity within NATO."164 
161 Admiral Norman W. Ray, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, Speech at the 
Assemblee Nationale, 23 January 1997. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California. 
162 de Wijk, pp. 132-133. 
163 Parmentier, p. 32. 
164 Ibid. See also North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session, Final Communique, 13 June 1996, 
par. 5-7. 
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The year 1997 witnessed wide conceptual differences between the French and the 
Germans in pushing forward the merger of the WEU within the EU, a condition sine qua 
non for realizing a genuine ESDI. First, the debate concerning the acceptance of the 
concept of a "lead-nation" capable of playing a key reconnaissance role in the conduct of 
an operation, ended with a last minute rapprochement on the conceptual plane at the May 
1997 WEU ministerial meeting in Paris, supposedly due to the experience of Bosnia. 
Second, their different conceptions of the necessary degree of national sovereignty to be 
abandoned for achieving an effective decision-making body in the EU that would 
implement the projected CFSP, led to a fragile compromise. 
Third, within the framework of the EU, following the February 1996 Franco-
German initiative, the EU member countries succeeded in updating at the Amsterdam 
Summit165 Article J-4 of the Treaty of Maastricht in connection with the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy operations.166 But, because the adopted guidelines did not 
receive unanimous agreement among the EU partners--the German and French 
conceptions in particular were widely different --a more significant achievement at the 
165 Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997. 
166 The key words for these operations are: "reinforced co-operation," "replacement of the veto by 
abstention," and "constructive abstention." Thus, the Treaty does allow for a form of "constructive 
abstention," whereby a state could abstain from a vote, allowing the decision to go ahead but without 
having to implement it. See The Treaty of Amsterdam,2 October 1997, Article I-Amendments to the 
Treaty of Maastricht, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title V of the Treaty on 
European Union). Available [On line]: [http://ue.eu.intiAmsterdam/en/amsteroc/en/treaty/treaty.htm]. [10 
February 1998]. 
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summit in the field of the ESDI was not realized. 167 It could be concluded that 1997 was 
a year of minimum progress in the institutional development of the ESDI. 
On the American side, in 1996-1997 the only major concern was the AFSOUTH 
debate. The Americans attempted to delay the discussion about the subject because this 
topic, combined with the "Deputy SACEUR" one,168 could lead to adjustments in the 
European position within the Atlantic Alliance and undermine American leadership. 
William Perry, then Secretary of Defense, stated that "the presence of the American Sixth 
Fleet was a determining factor in the regional balance of power. He also considered 
American leadership crucial as he thought this region to have the highest risk of 
crises."169 Focused on the process of NATO enlargement, the u.S. tried to maintain a 
status quo in the American-European defense relationship and, thus, to avoid any source 
of further tension. 
The German position during 1997 toward the Southern flank debate might be 
described as follows: 
167 Parmentier, pp. 32-34. The changes made in Amsterdam were limited to the setting up ofa foreign 
policy planning and analysis unit at the EU Council of Ministers; the appointment as a High Representative 
of an EU bureaucrat (the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers), rather than a prominent politician, 
as some member states wanted; and closer cooperation--but no merger--between the EU and the WEU. 
Majority voting, it was agreed, would be used only in the "implementation" phases offoreign policy, 
whereas strategic choices would still have to be agreed unanimously. 
168 France and the United Kingdom wanted a permanent ruling creating a Deputy SACEUR, who, in 
addition to his function as "second in command," would also become the strategic operations commander 
or co-ordinator for WEU-Ied operations. Germany too moved gradually towards this position, which was 
adopted by the Alliance, in rather general terms. 
169 de Wijk, p. 136. After all, in the U.S. opinion, differences between Greece and Turkey could 
complicate the designation of a European commander for the southern region. 
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In the quarrel which began in the summer of 1997 [in fact, in the summer 
of 1996] between the French and the Americans over the nationality of the 
commander of the Southern region, the Germans have supported France 
strongly and openly by very firm public declarations (e.g. Mr. Ruhe in 
Oslo on 25 September 1996), probably because they felt that a visible 
Europeanisation of NATO would reassure the Russians that NATO 
enlargement would not come at their expense. As a matter of fact, as soon 
as Russia accepted the fait accompli of NATO enlargement ... at the 
Helsinki summit in March 1997, the Germans retreated and came up with 
proposals for a division of responsibilities in the Southern region which is 
far to say were impossible for the French to accept. 170 
In September 1997, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Klaus 
Naumann of the German Army, said, 
The European nations in the region concerned do not support the French 
proposal. France is not speaking in behalf of Europe. The Mediterranean 
is NATO's most endangered region. From a NATO point of view, at this 
time, it is good to have American command in AFSOUTH.171 
G. FINAL REMARKS 
In theory, in the post-Cold War period, the United States had always been 
supportive of European efforts to deVelop a CFSP and an ESDI to help implement it, as 
called for at Maastricht. Yet seen from the European perspective, the efforts of the 
United States had not always seemed to match the rhetoric. As the Soviet threat 
disappeared, and the West Europeans, for the first time in the post-Second World War 
170 Parmentier, p. 30. 
171 He added that statistically Europeans do contribute much to the AFSOUTH forces: about 70% of land 
forces and 60% of air assets. "In purely mathematical terms, there is some justification [for France's 
argument, but] you have to look at the Mediterranean." Deutsche Presse Agentur, 30 September 1997. 
Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
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period, began to feel that they might be able to meet more of their own immediate 
security needs without direct assistance from the U.S., the Americans appeared to be 
ambivalent at best (if not openly hostile) toward the efforts of the European members of 
NATO to develop their own security identity.I72 "The tension between the European 
desire for greater independence and the American desire to avoid creation of a 
competition for NATO became a source of considerable frustration among Allies." 173 
On the one hand, there was no U.S. interest to contribute to the creation of a 
possible competitor to NATO. On the other hand, the construction of an ESDI was seen, 
legitimately, to be primarily a European concern. This was to be translated in a period of 
two years (1990-1992) in which the debate on ESDI was reduced to a cycle: 
European proposals would be put forward with very little input from 
Washington; the U.S. would then react negatively to the elements of the 
concept it did not like, while saying nothing about the elements if found 
acceptable. Underlying this Washington approach was also a subtle 
suspicion among many on both sides of the Atlantic that, left to their own 
devices, the Europeans would never be able to agree on any alternative to 
acting within NATO.174 
172 As Gunther van Well, the insightful former German Ambassador to the United States pointed out, "the 
U.S. has always followed a two-track policy that combines principled support for European unity with 
insistence that the military and economic position of the United States in Europe must remain so strong that 
its influence would not diminish in the face of further steps toward European integration." As quoted in 
Jonathan Dean, Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Searchfor Peace and Security (New York: The 
Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p. 284. 
173 Nelson S. Drew, "From Berlin to Bosnia: NATO in transition, 1989-1994," Reforging the Trans-




In November 1992 a new Administration was elected on the theme of change and 
responding to domestic concerns. A fundamental shift in the U.S. position on ESDI took 
place for two reasons. First, the U.S. wanted to continue NATO's evolution toward 
becoming an instrument that could address security concerns such as the Yugoslav crisis. 
Second, the new administration intended to influence NATO less directly and in a more 
detached manner than the previous one. 
It is important to mention that the 1994 Brussels summit communique "contained 
28 references to ESDI, the WEU and related concepts such as CFSP and the 
Eurocorps."175 On this occasion, the United States accepted Europe's goal of establishing 
ESDI within NATO and separable from NATO, depending on the circumstances; and in 
fact the United States would help develop the ESDI through the new concept: the C1TF. 
It is nonetheless important to underline that cautionary phrases such as: "separable but not 
separate," "transparency and complementarity," "not in competition with NATO," and 
"does not dilute NATO" remain (and are endorsed by all the allies) in the official 
documents of NATO. 
After 1994, the U.S. was still ambivalent with regard to a more prominent 
European role in the spheres of security and defense: 
175 Barry, p. 76. 
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On the one hand greater European responsibility was welcomed because it 
allowed the Americans to concentrate on their global commitments. On 
the other hand, the Americans in NATO did not wish to be confronted 
with irreversible European positions as result of common foreign and 
security policy within the European Union. 176 
There continues to be a tendency in the U.S. to see a choice between defense 
structures dominated by NATO and those organized around the EU and/or the WEU, and 
at least part of the present satisfaction in the U.S. with the state of the transatlantic 
relationship can be attributed to an unstated view that NATO has "won" the competition, 
at least for now. 
After the 1994 summit, European-U.S. relations were evolving toward a more 
balanced partnership because Europe was growing increasingly stronger, more integrated, 
and more independent. ESDI is a deliberately vague concept reflecting the intent of 
NATO's European members to develop a collective identity in security and defense 
matters. It is intended not only to reflect the importance of NATO but also to provide a 
separate identity and complementarity to national defense policies. 
In addition to its impact on the U.S. role in Europe, ESDI could deeply affect EU 
cohesion. Thus, the United States wants an ESDI that will not result in the U.S. facing 
fait accompli positions at NATO consultative meetings. In sum, the Americans 
recognized and accepted the reality of ESDI and are committed to furthering it within the 
context of a broader NATO structure. 
176 de Wijk, p. 122. 
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Germany's special interests regarding ESDI are twofold: on the one hand, there is 
a rather strong institutional interest in maintaining and developing the overall EU 
framework. On the other hand, some special interests177 de-emphasize the role of the 
ESDI concept. Thus, Germany has a stake in balancing its European and Atlantic 
ambitions, and in continuing its role as a mediator between France and the U.S. in their 
traditional disputes. 
Bonn's priorities in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe encouraged Germany 
to try to involve as many EU and NATO countries as possible in the region. In this 
respect, NATO provided the best multilateral instrument in the military field. Therefore, 
Germany is interested in engaging as many institutions as possible in this region. This is 
the reason for Bonn's strong' inclination to give the ESDI (WEU) a role in the region, too, 
although its real capabilities to play an efficient role are limited. Furthermore, for a 
number of historical and societal reasons, Germany tended to take the role of 
international organizations, institutions, and alliances as a boundary condition, a factor 
that sets limits to national policies. At the same time, Bonn strives to modify these 
boundaries by changing the policies of these international institutions in specific desired 
directions. 
From the German perspective, in the post-Cold War period the evolution of the 
WEU and the creation of an ESDI were pursued while taking into account the following 
177 Due to the tremendous burdens it carries with regard to its unification and to Central and Eastern 
Europe, Gennany no longer has sufficient financial means to promote and finance the ESDI. 
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factors. First, despite the disagreements of the 1990-1992 years, the transatlantic 
relationship, and in particular the close German-U.S. ties, were not jeopardized. Since 
the military component of this relationship is most visible and best realized within 
NATO, Germany always had certain reservations with regard to the creation of a "purely" 
European defense. Thus, it was in the German security interest to ensure that both 
alliances (i.e., NATO and the WEU) would remain fully congruent and compatible rather 
than move toward conflict with one other and that this fact would be reflected in both 
form and structure. 
Second, the development of a CFSP of the EU will take many years, but is 
nevertheless a precondition for the creation of an ESDI. Thus, the United States should 
give up its reservations and remind the Europeans, if they want to build the WEU as the 
European pillar of NATO, what this "means in terms of a defense burden and a more 
responsible role for defending common Western interests outside the traditional NATO 
treaty area." 178 
Third, in 1995-1997 it became very difficult for Germany to balance the Franco-
American relationship. On one hand, Germany needs France for Chancellor Kohl's 
vision of a united Europe. On the other, Germany also needs the U.S., because "[o]nly 
the United States can provide a number of indispensable contributions to German and 
178 Mey, p. 315. 
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European security; the alliance with the United States serves the fundamental foreign and 
security policy interests of Germany." I 79 
Germany clearly could not afford to decide between the U.S. and France. But 
there are factors that hamper progress towards an ESDI, such as the lack of European 
political will to spend the resources necessary to acquire the assets that would diminish 
dependence on American capabilities, the risk of a "regionalization" of European 
security, and the conspicuous lack of consensus among West European countries on what 
sort of role Europe should playas a unitary actor on the world stage. The unifying, 
centripetal forces affecting the development of an ESDI are few and seem rather weak, 
whereas the centrifugal forces are numerous. 180 All those factors might lead to the 
thought "that a common [European] security and defense policy would pose a threat to 
NATO."181 
In this context, with the unification of Europe to remain a long-term vision for the 
time being, Germany might give highest priority to the Americans. This decision could 
mean for the Germans "to have a fair chance to accomplish all three national interests in 
179 Holger Mey, "German-American Relations: The Case for a Preference," Comparative Strategy, vol. 
14, (1995), p. 208. 
180 Opposition to a common European defense force, although far less than the proportion supporting this 
key aspect of European integration, remained in Germany higher than in Britain or France in 1995 (28% 
versus 25% and 15%, respectively just as in 1993). The proportion of Germans opposing such defense 
integration had, moreover, increased from 25% to 28% between 1993 and 1995. See U.S. Information 
Agency, The New European Security Architecture: Public Assess the Building Block of European Security 
(Washington, D.C.: USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, September, 1995), p. 31. 
181 Daniel Nelson, "Germany and the balance between threats and capacities in Europe," International 
Politics, vol. 34, no. 1 (March 1997), p. 67. 
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parallel: a strategic alliance between the United States and Europe, West European 
integration, and all-European security."182 
The post-Cold War period showed that America has become a nation more like 
others, the only remaining superpower but actually less influential with its allies than it 
used to be. The United States will need friends and markets even when it does not have 
enemies. Finally, the U.S. feared a separate West European path in political, military, 
and economic affairs. In this context, a united Europe could play a new and more 
important role in the transatlantic relationship, and it may be able to function as a more 
powerful partner of the U.S. in the international arena. However, the gap in U.S.-
European military capabilities, evident also before the end of the Cold War, continues to 
widen 183 and this trend contributes to the increased European dependence on advanced 
U.S. military assets, such as airlift, sealift, and communications, command, control, 
computers and intelligence (C4I). 
In this setting, Germany could play an active and constructive role in shaping the 
European unification process while ensuring that the transatlantic link remains intact. As 
Chancellor Kohl stated in his speech to the French Senate in November 1993, "Europe 
182 Mey, "Gennan-American Relations: The Case for a Preference," p.209. 
183 See the statements ofNonnan W. Ray, "The Transfonnation of NATO: Challenges and Prospects," 
(Address to the AFCEA Europe Symposium: "Technet Europe '96," 17 October 1996); Javier Solana, 
NATO Secretary General, "Speaking Notes for the Secretary General for his Afternoon Remarks," 
(SACLANT Seminar, Lisbon, Potrugal, 4-5 May 1997); and General Klaus Naumann, Chainnan of 
NATO's Military Committee, "The Imperative of Allied Defence Collaboration: The Case for MEADS," 
(Address to the Members of the United States Congress and Senate, 23 June 1997, Washington, D.C.). 
Texts furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
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needs the United States-but the United States needs a Europe which takes more 
responsibility for itself and for international security." 184 
Nevertheless, at the Cold War's end, Western societies must do more to define 
positive perspectives, for that is the only way that CEE can be permanently Westernized. 
The political and social cohesion and economic health of the EU and its CEE partners 
must be considered among the most important determinants of the future of security in 
Europe. Thus, NATO's new role in cooperating with former adversaries and other non-
NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region deserves a closer look. Moreover, 
considering the outcome of the 1997 Madrid NATO summit concerning the Alliance's 
enlargement, and the traditional special German interest in Mitteleuropa, analyzing the 
German and American attitudes toward cooperation with former CEE adversaries might 
advance understanding of why the two countries could remain pivotal partners in 
efficiently addressing Europe's security dilemmas. 
184 As quoted in Helmut Willman, "The European Corps-Political Dimension and Military Aims, " RUSI 
Journal, vol. 139, August 1994, p. 33. 
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IV. POST -COLD WAR GERMAN-AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD 
COOPERATION WITH FORMER CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPEAN ADVERSARIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since its formation between 1949-1950185, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
has achieved two fundamental results. First, it "won" the Cold War without firing a shot. 
It proved also to be the most important aspect of a Western policy of containment of 
Soviet expansion that culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the 
communist governments of Eastern Europe. Second, NATO provided the necessary 
security framework for the economic and political integration of Western Europe, which 
fostered European Union institutions strong enough to rule out war among states that had 
been fighting one another for over a millennium. 
As the communist regimes of Eastern Europe began to collapse, NATO 
governments, led by the United States and Germany, undertook rapid steps, while 
avoiding measures that might alarm the declining Soviet Union, to deal with the desires 
of the new democratic governments of Eastern Europe for some degree of security 
assurance in a confusing new situation. Their objective was also to improve long-term 
chances for democratic government in the former Warsaw Pact states by transmitting to 
185 On the origins ofNA TO see, for example, Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The 
Origins a/the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981) and Robert S. 
Jordan, with Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1979). 
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their armed forces and civilian leaders essential concepts from Western practice. This 
situation has increasingly obliged NATO to struggle with the problem of achieving its 
ultimate political objective, as stated in the 1967 Harmel Report: "to achieve a just and 
lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees."186 
Moreover, despite the fact that NATO is an intergovernmental organization in 
which national views must be reconciled, Germany and the United States played a 
decisive role in expressing the Alliance's determination to construct a stable political 
order in Europe as a whole. In this process, two of the keys to stability in Europe are 
considered to be the Western relationship to Russia and the internal development of 
Europe's society. 
German actions have been embedded in multilateral frameworks, and have 
followed a strategy of diversification, balance and compensation. In the absence of a 
strategic threat, united Germany has acted as "a civilian power," avoiding as far as 
possible the ways of a traditional great power and hence the use of force. 187 
Conventional European (through institutions such as the EU, the WEU, the Council of 
Europe, and the OSCE) and NATO diplomacy monopolized quite successfully the 
mediation between Germany and the Central and Eastern European states. 
F or some Americans, the new environment brought an implicit warning in the 
transatlantic bargain, namely that the U.S. might abandon its interest in European 
186 North Atlantic Council, Harmel Report, 13-14 December 1967, par. 9. 
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security. Such warnings were based on a complete misjudgment of Europe's unique role 
as a key strategic region for North American security. Europe continued to playa vital 
role in the U.S. security calculus. The Americans need to stay in Europe: "every security 
problem which touches on the military great power Russia, every crisis which has even 
the remotest nuclear dimension, and every conflict which threatens escalation on NATO 
territory thus will force the United States to become engaged."188 
It should be noted that the U.S. has a special interest in close German-American 
relations. It seems clear that partnership with the strongest nation in the heart of Europe 
serves U.S. interests in influencing European affairs. "Europe, and in addition Germany, 
provide a strategic base for the United States from which it can pursue its national and 
common interests in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia, as well as in the Near 
and Middle East."189 
In this context, the Alliance launched in 1990 its new policy of "cooperation with 
former adversaries,"190 a phrase that announced two new roles for the Allies. 191 "To 
pursue the development of co-operative structures of security for a Europe whole and 
187 The Gennan domestic debate over security policy is predominantly characterized by an almost total 
neglect of military power as an instrument of foreign policy. 
188 Michael Ruehle and Nick Williams, "View from NATO: Why NATO Will Survive," Comparative 
Strategy, vol. 16 (1997), p. 113. 
189 Mey, "View from Gennany: Gennan-American Relations: The Case for a Preference," p.209. 
190 See the 5-6 July 1990 London Declaration and the 7-8 Novemberl991 Strategic Concept. 
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free,"192 NATO has established four new institutions: Partnership for Peace (PFP); the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; the NATO-Ukraine Commission; and the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) in May 1997. 
This set of institutions tried to address at least two of the most important issues of 
European security in the post-Cold War environment: first, to what extent Russia and the 
other CEE states will take part in a set of Western political, economic and military 
institutions led by the U.S., Germany, the U.K. and France; second, how military power 
might be readied or employed to influence political developments in or near Europe, 
especially where the interests of the great powers are not in conflict. In this context, 
German and American attitudes towards NATO's cooperation with former CEE 
adversaries clearly deserve closer scrutiny. 
Given that "NATO also provides a unique institutional framework for the 
Europeans to affect American policies"193 and that "liberal democracies successfully 
influence each other, in the framework of international institutions by using norms and 
191 The cooperation with former adversaries (and, increasingly, other non-NATO countries) will ensure 
complementarity with the OSCE in the Euro-Atlantic region and support an "open-ended" process of 
NA TO enlargement. 
192 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7-8 November 1991, par. 19. 
193 Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in 
Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture o/National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia Press University, 1996), p. 396. 
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joint decision-making procedures as well as transnational policies,"194 this analysis could 
provide a better understanding of the two countries' particular interests in establishing a 
new "concert of Europe" and of some of the rationales that led to the process of NATO's 
enlargement. 
Moreover, analyzing the German and American strategic decisions and actions in 
the development of this process might throw light on a larger question: whether this new 
set of institutions is an effective answer to the Old Continent's security concerns or only 
"a diversion from the specific policy issues arising in the eastern half of Europe" and 
"from direct discussion of the vital interests, regional policies and needed military 
readiness of the governments in the Euro-Atlantic community."195 To achieve the 
mentioned above goals, it is necessary to examine, at a minimum, the following topics: 196 
• The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council; 
• The Partnership for Peace; and, 
• The process of NATO enlargement. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Philip Zelikow, "The Masque ofInstitutions," in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO's Transformation: The 
Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), p. 88. 
196 A complete analysis would include also the German and American attitudes toward Russia and 
Ukraine. 
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B. NACC AND EAPC 
In the post-Cold War period NATO has changed in at least three important 
aspects: NATO-sponsored cooperative institutions have been established to include the 
former members of the Warsaw Pact and other non-NATO countries, beginning with the 
creation of the NACC; it has acknowledged that political, economic and even 
environmental concerns are gaining greater importance, while the military missions of the 
Alliance have become more complex; and NATO has redefined its military missions. 
The NATO London Declaration of July 1990 cited the need for the establishment 
of a closer relationship with the CEE nations. In terms of concrete proposals, it suggested 
"military contacts" between NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders, "regular diplomatic 
liaison" between NATO and the states of the Warsaw Pact, and a joint declaration by the 
nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact affirming that they were "no longer 
adversaries. "197 
In April 1991 the U.S. reaffirmed its support for the positive developments in 
CEE, but implied that countries in this region should not expect membership in NATO 
and/or explicit security guarantees: 
197 North Atlantic Council, London Declaration, July 5-6, 1990, par. 6-8. This declaration was made in 
Paris in November 1990, less than eight months before the Warsaw Pact was formally disbanded in July 
1991. 
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European security is indivisible. The United States is committed to 
supporting the process of democracy, as well as the independence and 
sovereignty of Central-East European countries. . . . Formal military 
alliances and guarantees are not the sole measures of national security, nor 
the only means of filling perceived political and security vacuums. 198 
At the June 1991 Copenhagen NATO meeting, the Alliance proposed the "further 
development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships" with the former 
Warsaw Pact nations, including the Soviet Union. 199 During the debates for adopting the 
final communique of the meeting, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher "in 
particular believed that deepening the contacts between NATO and Central and Eastern 
Europe was implicit recognition ofNA TO's role as [ a] stabilizing factor in Europe."200 
In October 1991 Genscher and his American counterpart James Baker presented 
an initiative to put the CEE countries at ease by "strengthening and deepening co-
operation"201 in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Thus, the November 1991 Rome 
Declaration proposed the creation of such a body.202 Consequently, on December 20, 
1991, the NATO ministers of foreign affairs met with their counterparts from the former 
Warsaw Pact in Brussels for the first session of the NACC. 
198 Paul Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Remarks at the Conference on "Future of 
European Security," Prague, Czechoslovakia, 25 April 1991, pp. 3-4. Text furnished by Professor David 
Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
199 New York Times, 7 June 1991. 
200 de Wijk, p. 31. 
201 Ibid. 
202 After the summit the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, including the Baltic states, were invited to a 
meeting with the NATO ministers of foreign affairs to formally commence the new initiative. 
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The first meeting of the NACC was itself of enough symbolic significance 
to ensure its place in NATO's history despite a certain lack of substance. 
Moreover, occurring on the very day when the Soviet Union ceased to 
exist, it was somewhat overshadowed by this event.203 
During this first session, both Genscher and Baker described the NACC as a new 
pillar of the emerging European security order. It was intended to play specific and 
unique functions.204 Among them it would serve as a forum for consultation with the 
"liaison states" on issues such as civilian control over the military and the conversion of 
defense industries to civilian purposes; it might also serve as a forum for negotiating 
further conventional arms control and confidence and security building measures; and it 
was suggested that the NACC could playa peace-making role in Nagomo-Karabakh and 
other contested areas in the former Soviet Union and CEE.205 
James Sperling concluded that, after the Copenhagen and Rome North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) meetings, visible change occurred in the Alliance's fundamental tasks: 
203 de Wijk, p. 63. 
204 The initiative provided for annual meetings at ministerial level in the NACC, periodic meetings with 
the ambassadors, extra meetings "as circumstances warrant," and regular meetings with the Military 
Committee and other NA TO committees. The meetings would concentrate on matters ofNA TO expertise, 
such as defense planning and civil-military relations. See North Atlantic Council, Rome Declaration on 
Peace and Cooperation. Rome, 7-8 November 1991, Sect. 9-12. 
205 See North Atlantic Council, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, p. 21; James A. Baker, III, 
"US Commitment to Strengthening Euro-Atlantic Cooperation," US Department of State Dispatch, 2 (23 
December 1991), p. 903; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Bulletin der Bundesregierung, il (12 March 1992), p. 
264; Robert Mauthner, "NATO, CIS peace plan for Nagomo-Karabakh, Financial Times, 11 March 1992; 
Edward Mortimer, "Europe's Security Surplus," Financial Times, 4 March 1992. 
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military principles are reinforced by an up-dated and reformulated 
Harmel doctrine, which was the prior touchstone of alliance policy. The 
dyad of detente and defense has been replaced with a triad of dialogue, 
cooperation, and collective defense capability within the alliance and the 
triad of dialogue, partnership, and cooperation among the member states of 
the NACC.206 
At the same time, NATO "sought to offer the former communist states some 
surrogate connection, just enough to keep them happy, but not too much, so as not to 
raise their expectations."207 Touted as "a most ingenious invention," and "with no 
particular thinking behind it,"208 NACC was similar in its procedures and methods of 
operation to the OSCE, reflecting in a way the Genscherist belief "that strengthening the 
CSCE was a way to increase stability in Central and Eastern Europe, a vital German 
interest. "209 
In this setting, in order to achieve its post-1989 security objectives-to create a 
pan-European security system that integrates Germany into Europe as an equal if not a 
leading state; to accelerate the demilitarization of the European area in order to create an 
environment favoring German economic interests, a development that would increase 
German leverage with the other European states and minimize Germany's historically 
dictated disadvantage in the military realm; to retain an American political-military 
206 Sperling, p. 265. 
207 Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's enlargement: anatomy of a decision," International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4 
(October 1997), p. 701. 
208 Ibid. 
209 de Wijk, p. 31. 
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presence in Europe as insurance against the failure of a demilitarized pan-European 
security structure; and, to ensure the integration of the republics of the former Soviet 
Union, especially Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in that pan-European order-Germany 
pursued a pragmatic policy to secure its immediate Vorposten. 
Thus, Germany advocated the necessity of Western help for the CEE countries 
(especially for the Visegrad states-Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak 
Republics) in order to obtain the guarantees that they felt they needed for their own 
security and a stable domestic development. Germany's prime interest was to establish a 
stable security space between its eastern border and the Russian frontier.2IO In this 
context, it also sought to engage the CEE states in European structures.2II NATO was 
intended to become, in the words of then Foreign Minister Genscher, "a transatlantic 
security bridge for the whole of Europe, for the democracies of Eastern and Western 
Europe."212 
These actions and statements were components of a strategy consistent with a 
foreign and security policy which, since German unification, "has been designed to 
deepen the traditional Westbindung (Western integration) and simultaneously widen the 
210 Haftendorn, p. 99. 
211 Bilateral treaties have been signed between Gennany and the fonner countries of the Warsaw Pact in 
the early 1990s with the intent to commit the Gennan government to advocate EU membership for the 
countries involved. 
212 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Eine Vision fur das ganze Europa," Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 14 
(February 1991), p. 92. As quoted in Sperling, p. 266. 
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Euro-Atlantic structures to the East."213 From a German perspective it was natural to 
pursue such policies because, as Christoph Boer stated: 
In the long term, no country will be able to derive greater benefits from 
intensified cooperation with the East than Germany .... And as no country 
is so directly affected by the threat of instability as Germany, no country 
must do as much to reconstruct the East as Germany. Germany's interests 
and responsibilities demand this in equal measure.214 
In the German domestic political arena, relations with CEE and Russia in 
particular were perceived by public opinion in 1992 as the country's top vital interest.215 
Despite broad support in some decision-making circles for pro-East policies, "the lack of 
strategic thinking of the political class becomes increasingly obvious. Unfortunately, the 
academic comm~ity provides also little help in this respect."216 Overall German 
policies before Maastricht and the collapse of the Soviet Union were prudent responses to 
outside challenges. After the above mentioned events took place, however, "a more 
213 Karl-Heinz Kamp and Peter Weilemann, "Germany and the Enlargement of NATO," Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, Occasional Papers in European Studies (OP-97/23, September 1997), p. 
1. 
214 Christoph Boehr, "At the End of the Post-War Order in Europe: In Search ofa New Coherence of 
Interests and Responsibilities," Aussenpolitik (vol. 46, no. 2), p. 5. A valable [On line]: 
[http://www.isn.ethz.chiaupollhoehr.htm]. [30 January 1990]. 
215 Ronald D. Asmus, Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Public Opinion and Security Policy in 1994 
(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1995), pp. 7-9. 
216 Holger M. Mey, "New Members-New Mission: The Real Issues Behind the New NATO Debate," 
Comparative Strategy, vol. 13, no. 2 (April/June 1994), p. 224. 
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fundamental debate on European order and [the] German role within it began to 
emerge."217 
It might be concluded that, at the moment when NACC was created, 
A continuation of the postwar strategy of self-containment, which had 
complemented the American security strategy of double-containment and has had 
the (retrospectively beneficial) consequence of producing foreign and security 
polices that reflexively expressed German interests in the language of Europe or 
the Atlantic Alliance. Germany has offered to entrap itself in integrative and 
constraining political and military structures, despite a legitimate claim to 
European leadership by virtue of geography, demography, economic capacity, and 
latent military power. 218 
From the American perspective the creation of the NACC was part of a larger 
strategy involving diplomacy and economics, in order to maintain a political-military 
equilibrium in Eurasia. It was in the U.S. strategic interest to promote a balanced 
configuration of power in this part of the world, presumably following from at least three 
specific interests: 
(i) To prevent the total disintegration of the Soviet Union and, that 
failing, to promote the emergence of stable, democratic, and 
prosperous successor states; 
(ii) To prevent the reimposition of Soviet or Russian military or 
political control in Eastern Europe, which presumably can best be 
217 Hartmut Mayer, "German concepts on a European order," International Affairs (vol. 73, no. 4, October 
1997), p. 724. Ideas and arguments about the new role of Germany in international affairs in the post-1989 
setting were exchanged in various political circles and foundations, in universities, think tanks (such as the 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, the Bertelsmann 
Foundation, the Centrum fur angewandte Politikforschung) and in the quality media (most importantly the 
Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit and Suddeutsche Zeitung). However, compared to Washington, 
with its open competition among institutes, lobbies and political consultants, the practical influence of the 
German international affairs community on government policy was and continues to be limited. 
218 Sperling, p. 276. 
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achieved by NATO guaranteeing the national independence, 
territorial integrity, political democracy and diplomatic neutrality 
of the former Soviet-bloc states; [and,] ... 
(iv) To encourage stability in Central and Eastern Europe by 
strengthening the new democracies.219 
The 8 June 1992 (Oslo) and the 18 December 1992 (Brussels) NACC meetings of 
foreign ministers proved to be turning points for the NACC because they "cleared the 
way for active co-operation between NATO and the partners in the field of peace-
keeping."220 The NACC work plan for 1993 included the following activities: 
Consultations on peacekeeping and related matters, starting in a 
brainstorming format at ambassadorial level, followed by ad-hoc meetings 
of political-military experts, as agreed by ambassadors, leading to 
cooperation among interested NACC members in preparation for peace-
keeping activities, including: joint-sessions on planning of peace-keeping 
training, and consideration of possible joint peace-keeping exercises. 221 
According to de Wijk, "The first brainstorming session of the ambassadors took 
place on 26 January 1993 on the basis of a German-American non-paper."222 As a result 
219 Huntington, p.l3. 
220 de Wijk, p. 67. 
221 North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Work Planfor Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1993, 
Brussels, 18 December 1992, p. 2. 
222 de Wijk, p. 68. 
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of these activities, in February 1993 the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation In 
Peacekeeping was founded.223 
The U.S. in particular believed that, starting from this group, the NACC could 
form the nucleus of a new security system. A structure needed to be developed which 
would enable the partners to take part in an operational "framework," with NATO acting 
as a catalyst behind this development. "The Americans directed their endeavors mainly 
towards involving the Russians in all questions concerning European security in order to 
avoid a new division of Europe."224 The German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, argued 
for a more operational role for the NACC.225 "There was consensus within NATO that 
intensification of co-operation with the Central and Eastern European countries could 
promote stability and security in the whole ofEurope."226 
Under these circumstances, the NACC activities (1992-1997) consisted in fact 
mainly of meetings-workshops, conferences, seminars, colloquiums, etc. The initial 
agenda was repeatedly expanded in annual agreed work plans227, and eventually 
223 Ibid. The work of this group progressed rapidly and as a result it prepared a series of reports in the 
next years. See, for example, the NACC meeting in Athens on 11 June 1993. 
224 Ibid., p. 69. 
225 Ibid., p. 70. The German position coincided with the French one and this was to lead to the "Pact of 
Stability" (known also as the "Balladur Plan") which aimed to resolve points of difference between CEE 
countries by means of regional consultative forums, so that stability would be increased. 
226 Ibid., p. 72. 
227 This was also a result of the fact that since mid-I993 it was clear that the Central European states were 
no longer satisfied with the tactics of "prevarication" pursued by a mechanism of postponing decisions, in 
which NACC, at that moment, had great chances of being transformed. Eyal, p. 702. 
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encompassed topics such as peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, defense budgets 
and economic planning, air defense, military procurement, disarmament technologies, 
materiel and technical standardization, and communications and information systems 
operability. 228 
Cooperation within the NACC was aimed increasingly at crisis control, and with 
the successful development of the PFP after December 1994, the Americans had "already 
maintained that the NACC had fulfilled its function, namely the demolition of barriers 
between East and West."229 From the German perspective, complementarity between the 
NACC and PFP was required in order to promote the salient features of German security 
and defense policy, as stated in the 1994 German White Paper on Defense: 
As far as Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, Germany's policy is 
thus characterized by three key terms: stabilization through cooperation 
and integration. These three factors of a forward-looking approach to 
stability are indivisible elements of a convincing overall concept. The 
transfer of stability will benefit everyone. Stability in and for Europe is 
the future crucial task of the Euro-Atlantic community.230 
In the new context, the center of gravity was shifting to topics such as 
peacekeeping, arms control verification, scientific and environmental cooperation, and 
the conversion of defense industries, and to an enterprise designed to be more inclusive 
228 See NATO Handbook (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, October 1995). 
229 de Wijk, p. 87. 
230 White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the 
Bundeswehr, 1994, chapter 3, par. 313, p. 42. 
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than the NACC and to encompass activities in addition to meetings--the PFP.231 Thus, a 
new institution was required. The NACC was replaced in May 1997 by an organization 
including all PFP and NACC participants-the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, a new 
forum that would "combine the activities of NATO' s aging Cooperation Council (NACC) 
and the PiP Program. "232 
Warren Christopher, then U.S. Secretary of State, first proposed the EAPC on 6 
September 1996. 
We should involve our Partners in the planning as well in the execution of 
NATO missions. We should give them a stronger voice by forming an 
Atlantic Partnership Council. In all these ways, NATO gives us a 
foundation to built our New Atlantic Community-one in which all of 
Europe and North America work together to build lasting security, one 
that succeeds where all past efforts have failed.233 
A few weeks later, during the informal meeting of the NATO ministers of defense 
(on 25-26 September 1996, at Bergen, Norway), the German minister of defense 
suggested a merger of the NACC and PFP, and also suggested the aim of an enhanced 
PFP in order to minimize the distance between NATO members and non-members.234 
Thus, from the German and American perspective, this council "would be a body for 
231 See Robert Weaver, "NACC's Five Years of Strengthening Cooperation," NATO Review, vol. 45 
(May/June 1997), pp. 24-26. 
232 Kamp and Weilemann, p. 12. 
233 Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speech in Stuttgart, 6 September 1996. Text from USIS 
Wireless File. 
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consultations between NATO and the OSCE members,"235 and, thus, at the NAC meeting 
in December 1996, the Allies "agreed to work with the partners on the initiative to 
establish APC."236 
Upon its establishment on 30 May 1997, in Sintra, Portugal, the EAPC adopted 
the NACC work plan as its own, with a view to replacing it with an even more extensive 
agenda of topics for consultations. The EAPC's founders, the NACC members and the 
PFP partners, declared that its establishment would be a "qualitative step forward in 
raising to a new level the dynamic and multifaceted political and military cooperation" 
already achieved in NACC and PFP, and that it would "make a strong contribution to 
cooperative approaches to security and form an enduring part of the European security 
architecture."237 
Germany insisted that the concrete tasks and purposes of such a forum be 
clarified. At least two aspects require clarification from the German perspective. 
First, the specific relationship between EAPC and the enhanced PFP 
remains unclear, as does the impact of EAPC on OSCE, which basically 
covers the same ground. Another question has to do with the impact of a 
proliferation of decision-making bodies on NATO's decision making.238 
234 de Wijk, p. 137. 
235 Ibid. 
236 North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, Brussels, 10 December 1996, par. 9. 
237 Chairman's Summary of the meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council, Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997, par. 3. 
238 Kamp and Weilemann, p. 12. 
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The EAPC is to be guided by the principles of inclusiveness and self-
differentiation.239 It will offer options for cooperation to Partners that aspire to NATO 
membership but that were not selected for the "first round" of enlargement and, in a 
formal sense, it is dependent on the NAC. At the same time it may illustrate the 
disadvantages of decision-making by consensus, which include the general risk of 
paralysis. The EAPC "is guided by the desire to soothe the disappointment of the 
unsuccessful applicants for membership by creating a whole range of different offers."240 
In this setting, because PFP and the process of NATO enlargement represent 
essential elements in the Western effort to extend the pattern of peace and prosperity 
achieved by NATO in Europe during the Cold War to a larger area, they deserve closer 
scrutiny. 
C. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE 
A variety of factors, which included persistent demands by the East Europeans to 
join the Alliance241 , the unstable situation in Russia, developments in the Yugoslav crisis, 
239 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 30 May 1997, par. 4. 
240 Kamp and Weileman, p. 12. 
241 In late April 1993, at the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., President Clinton 
met one-on-one with a series of CEE leaders, including the highly regarded leaders of Poland and the 
Czech Republic, Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel. Each delivered the same message to Clinton: their top 
priority was NATO membership. 
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as well as personnel changes (especially in the U.S. administration), contributed to the 
American and German actions in 1993 which envisaged "the birth of a new concept 
designed to meet the security concems''''242 of the CEE countries and the filling of the 
security void which had been created in the heart of the continent. Thus, two significant 
initiatives dominated from that moment NATO's and Europe's security agenda: the PFP 
and NATO's enlargement. 
At the June 1993 meeting of NAC foreign ministers in Athens, Greece, Warren 
Christopher said that expanding NATO's membership was "not now on the agenda."243 
On 21 September 1993, Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Adviser, 
gave a major foreign policy speech in which he argued that "the successor to a doctrine of 
containment must be a strategy of enlargement--enlargement of the world's free 
community of market democracies." And he added, "At the NATO summit that [the] 
president called for this January [1994], we will seek to update NATO, so that there 
continues behind the enlargement of market democracies an essential collective 
security. "244 
Thus, during the summer and fall of 1993, the Pentagon, the State Department and 
the National Security Council (NSC) collaborated in Washington regarding the launching 
242 de Wijk, p. 74. 
243 James M. Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," Washington Quarterly, vol. 21, 
no. 1 (Winter 1998), p. 87. 
244 Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," Lecture at the John Hopkins University School of 
Advanced International Studies Washington, D.C., u.s. Policy Information and Text, no. 97 (23 October 
1993), pp. 6-12. 
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of a proposal that would develop and increase military ties between NATO and its former 
adversaries.245 In September 1993, during the preparations for the announced summit the 
Americans proposed a solution in the form of a "Partnership for Peace." "Rapid 
enlargement was not part of the plan; neither was strengthening of the NACC. This 
would be seen by the Central and Eastern Europeans as an implausible attempt to 
postpone their membership debate. "246 
Officials at the Pentagon unanimously favored the PFP idea. From their 
standpoint it "did not make sense to talk about expansion until after NATO had 
established the type of military-to-military relationships that would enable new countries 
to integrate effectively into the Alliance."247 The State Department suggested making the 
PFP "the centerpiece of our NATO position,"248 while opposing any decision on 
enlargement. 
On 18 October 1993, at the White House, after a meeting with his main foreign 
policy advisers, President Clinton endorsed the reached consensus that "at the January 
summit, the alliance should formally present the PFP, and he should announce NATO's 
245 Goldgeier, p. 86. 
246 de Wijk, p. 74. 
247 Goldgeier, pp. 87-88. The PFP proposal was developed largely through the efforts of Gen. 
Shalikashvili and his staff, first as SACEUR and then as chairman of the JCS. ShaIikashvili and Les Aspin, 
then Secretary of Defense, opposed expansion and, in particular, feared diluting the effectiveness of 
NA TO. The Pentagon appeared to support a sequential approach toward enlargement: countries would 
participate in the PFP for a number of years and then the Alliance might start addressing the issue of 
expansion. 
248 Ibid., p. 90. 
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intention eventually to expand."249 The decision to develop the PFP was, for the 
moment, the Clinton administration's NATO outreach policy. 
In this context, at the informal meeting of the NATO defense ministers (19-21 
October 1993, Travemunde-Germany), Les Aspin, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, 
presented for the first time a detailed proposal for PFP. 250 He sought to gain Alliance 
endorsement for the new project, and emphasized that NATO would not enlarge soon.251 
From the American perspective the PFP was intended to create the possibility of 
reacting quickly to potential crises in Europe by means of political consultations based on 
Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.252 It would also be an agreement between the 16 
NATO countries and each "partner for peace," and it was meant to offer the possibility of 
made-to-measure cooperation. It was also sometimes presented as an activity within the 
NACC, instead of a new form of cooperation.253 Last, but not least, "the partnership was 
249 Ibid., p. 91. Among Clinton's top foreign-policy advisers, Lake sought to push ahead with expansion, 
Aspin and Shalikashvili sought to delay consideration of expansion and instead supported the PFP, and 
Christopher fell somewhere in between, open to gradual expansion but concerned about Russia's reaction. 
250 de Wijk, p. 75. 
251 Goldgeier, pp. 91-92. 
252 The launching of the PFP program was also coupled with an increased u.s. involvement in the 
handling of the war in the former Yugoslavia, which ultimately led to a major U.S. and NATO engagement 
in the region. 
253 de Wijk, pp. 74-75. 
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deliberately designed to enable member states to put off questions of formal enlargement 
and of NATO's ultimate disposition in post-Cold War Europe."254 
At Travemunde, German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, representing a younger 
generation of Christian Democratic leaders, and one of the first advocates of NATO's 
enlargement,255 received the U.S. initiative positively. The Germans eagerly embraced 
the PFP, even though their interpretation of its significance differed from that held by the 
Americans. In a sense it "may come to represent for [the new] Ostpolitik what flexible 
response once did for collective defence: an agreement to disagree."256 Ruehe also 
"maintained that it must be made quite clear that this was not to be regarded as a 
surrogate NATO membership."257 At the same time leaders in Bonn understood that this 
254 Charles A. Kupchan, "Strategic Visions," World Policy Journal (vol. Xl, no. 3, Fall 1994), p. 113. 
Whether the PFP should focus on each partner's individual relationship to NATO or evolve as a broader 
multilateral undertaking in which partners would also build new ties with each other triggered US 
interagency debate during the planning process. The DOD, in contrast to the NSC and the State 
Department, was initially intent on restricting the PFP to a series of bilateral agreements between 
individual states and NATO. The Pentagon was seeking to ensure that NA TO would retain complete 
control over the evolution of the PFP and feared that institutionalizing a multilateral framework might 
jeopardize this objective. All agencies eventually agreed that the PFP should be a multilateral undertaking. 
However, the Pentagon's concerns continue to be reflected in the PFP's focus on developing security 
cooperation primarily between NATO and individual partners. 
255 His early public remarks about NATO enlargement created quite a stir. Ruehe's Alastair Buchan 
Memorial Lecture in London, on 26 March 1993, is usually cited in this regard: Volker Ruehe, "Shaping 
Euro-Atlantic policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," Survival, vol. XXXV (Summer 1993), pp. 129-
137. 
256 David Haglund, "Germany's Central European Conundrum," European Security, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 
1995), p. 35. 
257 de Wijk, p. 75. 
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initiative, despite its weaknesses,258 was better than either "participating in central 
Europe's local alliances,"259 or reaching a deal with Moscow in order to keep the CEE 
region under controI.260 
Under these circumstances, at the Brussels NATO summit (10-11 January 1994) 
the heads of state and government approved three PFP documents on the first day, 
namely an invitation to countries wishing to take part in the program, a "framework 
document" in which the framework of the PFP was sketched, and a "classified 'Intra 
Alliance Understanding' with the interpretation of the allies of the PFP." 261 The PFP 
would function under the NAC; and Partners were invited to participate in NATO's 
political and military institutions so far as these concerned PFP activities.262 
During the next few years the PFP won recognition as "without doubt a 
diplomatic invention of the first order."263 Some of its most important aspects were as 
follows: the 16+ 1 formula allowed each Partner to determine the nature and depth of the 
258 The weaknesses included the following points: no relationship was established with NACC; PFP's 
focus on military cooperation implied inadequate opportunities for broad-based political cooperation; PFP 
was insufficiently focused on intra-regional military cooperation; there was continuing ambiguity within 
NATO about how and to what degree to include Russia in partnership activities; and, PFP enabled NATO 
to put off difficult decisions about its future. 
259 Eyal, p. 703. 
260 William E. Odom, "NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong," The National Interest (Spring 
1995), p. 41. 
261 de Wijk, p. 79. 
262 Partnership for Peace, Framework Document, Brussels, 11 January 1994, Sect. 3. 
263 de Wijk, p. 82. 
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--- -- -- -- ------------------------------------, 
cooperation, which meant there was a certain amount of self-differentiation;264 it made it 
clear to the CEE countries that NATO was concerned about their internal stability and 
security, without giving them a formal guarantee of security and without Moscow being 
able to accuse NATO of enticing these countries into the Western camp.265 
The activities of the PFP were to be coordinated with those of the NACC, so that 
maximum effectiveness and minimal duplication of the NACC work plan might be 
achieved.266 PFP activities in the fields of crisis control and military planning, especially 
the planning of exercises, would have to be coordinated via the newly established 
Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons, which was to function under the NAC. 
By the end of 1994, with the introduction of the Planning and Review Process 
(P ARP) for the interested Partners, the emphasis within the PFP shifted from 
peacekeeping exercises to planning.267 A Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) 
under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary-General was established and became the 
most active PFP forum.268 The NACC and the PFP were formally complementary. The 
PFP concentrated on practical defense-related and military cooperation activities, while 
264 This differed greatly from the NACC, whose work plan applied to every one. 
265 After all, PFP applied to the Russian Federation too. 
266 In practice it was at first unclear how the relationship between NACC and PFP should evolve. 
267 The PARP was introduced in January 1995. It was based on a two-year planning cycle and was 
intended to increase interoperability between the partners. Cooperation was limited to humanitarian aid, 
search and rescue, and peacekeeping. 
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the NACC was the forum for broad consultations on security issues, including security-
related economic issues.269 Furthermore, the activities of the NACC and the PFP were 
being increasingly combined. 
Despite the fact that "the PFP was very successful in bringing NATO and the 
Central and Eastern European countries closer together in the short term, "270 the PFP 
aroused ambivalent feelings in some partners, especially the Czech Republic and 
Poland.271 "On the one hand NATO seemed to have given the impression that the 
accession to NATO was imminent; on the other the PFP could be interpreted as an 
activity aimed at shelving membership."272 
The East Europeans nonetheless welcomed the fact that, unlike the procedures in 
NACC, the PFP plan envisaged from the start a process of self-differentiation, since 
cooperation agreements were signed between NATO and individual countries. But there 
were suspicions about its long-term implications; it was feared that NATO might not 
honor the expectations regarding accession that had been raised in these dedicated PFP 
268 This could meet, depending on the subject, in various combinations: the 16, the 16+ 1, the 16+several 
partners, or in a full NACC combination. Later it merged with the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation 
in Peacekeeping and formed the PMSC Ad Hoc Group. 
269 See North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Work Plan/or Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 
199411995, Brussels, 2 December 1994. 
270 de Wijk, p. 88. 
271 Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
272 Ibid., p. 89. 
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members.273 Worried about potential embarrassment, before the January 1994 NATO 
summit to be held in Brussels, the U.S. administration dispatched senior officials to all 
CEE capitals in order to explain this concept.274 
The result was a subtle shift in emphasis: having been created as an 
instrument for avoiding a discussion about NATO's enlargement, PfP was 
suddenly presented as a structure which 'neither promises NATO 
membership, nor precludes this membership'. And once PfP was in full 
swing, the same concept was presented as the road to NATO membership. 
Interestingly, however, it was not ptp which dictated either the pace of 
NATO's enlargement or the timing of the process; PfP remained the 
necessary smoke-screen for an essentially political debate which was 
conducted within the alliance.275 
For Germany, the PFP was an excellent opportunity to work for the integration of 
the CEE countries into both NATO and the EU, not only to ensure security in the heart of 
Europe, "but also in order to spare the Germans themselves any new historic choices 
between East and West."276 Moreover, as a supplement to NATO's PFP, Germany 
established close ties of military cooperation with its CEE neighbors on a bilateral and, in 
273 Goldgeier, p. 92. 
274 This carne as a reaction to President Lech Walesa's threats, which commanded attention in the West, to 
reject the PFP agreement. Just prior to his trip to Brussels, Clinton sent Polish-born General Shalikashvili, 
Czech-born U.S. ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, and Hungarian-born State Department adviser 
Charles Gati to explain the administration's policy and to quell criticism stemming from this region prior to 
the summit. 
275 Eyal, pp. 702-703. 
276 Ibid., p. 703. 
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some cases, trilateral basis.277 "Germany's noises were heard, particularly In 
Washington, where the argument on NATO initially proceeded on a different route, only 
to reach the same conclusion."278 
Finally, with the decision on enlargement ready to be taken at the July 1997 
summit meeting in Madrid, the Alliance was preparing solutions to prevent the 
emergence of new "dividing lines" in Europe after enlargement. In order to give the 
cooperation with "non-Allies" a new and more profound meaning, NATO's September 
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement announced that PFP would become a more significant 
institution for strengthening security in Europe after NATO enlargement. 279 
After a similar statement by NATO's Defense Ministers in June 1996280, in April 
1997 U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen underscored the need for the 
enhancement of the PFP, highlighting the central question of its purposes, including the 
types of "military contingencies" for which it should be prepared.281 Thus, several 
277 The Visegrad countries, the Baltic States and Slovenia were in particular offered military personnel 
exchange programs and military training and education programs, in addition to arms transfer 
arrangements. For example, the 1996 German defense budget allocated about 11 million-DM for such 
undertakings. See Kamp and Weilemann, p. 5. 
278 Eyal, p. 704. 
279 See Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 1995), par. 
34 and 36. 
280 See North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers session, 13 June 1996, par. 22. 
281 See Prepared Statement by William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, before the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, 23 April 1997, p. 8. 
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measures to enhance PFP were announced in May 1997 at Sintra and approved in July at 
the NATO summit in Madrid.282 
Thus, while there will inevitably be a distinction between Allies protected by 
Article 5 and partner countries that do not enjoy this type of commitment, even in an 
enhanced PFP, NATO allies--the U.S. and Germany in particular--might give the PFP 
significantly greater substance and different form in the future. 283 This is a necessary 
step, because otherwise the decline of the PFP into a marginal role would be inevitable 
and its role as an instrument for reducing the security differences between Allies and 
Partners the might be compromised.284 
D. THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
Although Henry Kissinger and Ronald Asmus, among others, advocated NATO 
enlargement as early as 1991- 1992,285 the Clinton administration initially took up the 
policy of the Bush administration. "The latter was marked by the prevalent view that an 
enlargement of NATO to include eastern Central European countries, would be a 
282 See NATO Press Release, "The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Program," Madrid, 8 July 1997. 
283 At a minimum, according to some experts, "peace enforcement" should be added to the list of 
specified PFP activities. See, for example, Vernon Penner, "Partnership for Peace," Strategic Forum, no. 
97 (December 1996), Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. 
284 For a comprehensive analysis see Michael Ruehle and Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace after 
NA TO Enlargement," European Security, vol. 5 (Winter 1996). 
285 Asmus, "Germany and America: Partners in Leadership?," p. 563; and Henry Kissinger, "The Alliance 
Needs Renewal in a Changed World," International Herald Tribune, 2 March 1992. 
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provocation for Moscow and was thus out of the question."286 President Clinton initially 
followed this example, and thus the new administration began to discuss the problem in 
earnest in the autumn of 1993.287 
The Clinton administration was divided over this issue. National Security 
Council (NSC) adviser Anthony Lake was most receptive to enlargement. Partly because 
the defense budget and the U.S. military presence in Europe had declined, the Pentagon 
opposed enlargement. Furthermore, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin considered that until 
the end of the century Russia would not become a military threat to other CEE countries. 
Although no one in the State Department called for the early accession of new NATO 
members, Secretary of State Warren Christopher favored the view stressed that the 
Alliance was open to new members if they fulfilled certain criteria. But then he accepted 
the arguments presented by Strobe Talbott in October 1993288, which basically promoted 
the view that NATO's expansion toward CEE would create new dividing lines in Europe, 
and fuel fears that the Alliance wanted to contain and isolate Russia.289 The Clinton 
Administration therefore came to the conclusion that a carefully weighed compromise 
286 Peter Rudolf, "The USA and NATO Enlargement," Aussenpolitik, vol. 47, no. 4 (1996), p. 1. 
Available [On line]: [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/aupol/474/rudolf.htm]. [20 January 1998]. Admittedly, 
this was not stated publicly; the Bush administration maintained silence on the issue. 
287 Goldgeier, pp. 87-88. 
288 Then Special Adviser to the President on the successor states of the Soviet Union and a close friend of 
President Clinton. 
289 Rudolf, p.l. 
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had to be found between consideration for Russia's position and the desire of CEE states 
to join NATO; and this compromise was the PFP. 
Criticism of the PFP by, among others, still prominent voices such as Kissinger 
and Brezinski, pressure from the "Polish-American Congress," and the fact that the 
Republican-led Congress discovered that the issue of NATO enlargement was a welcome 
vehicle for criticizing the administration's "Russia-first" policy pushed President Clinton 
to accelerate efforts to define the concept of NATO enlargement.290 
After President Clinton's remarks in July 1994 in Warsaw291 and the involvement 
of Richard Holbrooke292 in the enlargement debate in September 1994, the administration 
emphasized that the demand for a contribution to collective defense and for 
interoperability with NATO armed forces were criteria for early NATO membership. In 
addition, the acceding countries had to introduce democracy and establish a market 
economy and be willing to accept consensus decision-making in NATO. There would be 
no rigid timetables; all applications for membership would be individually examined.293 
290 Ibid., p. 2. 
291 For President Clinton's exchange with reporters in Warsaw after meeting with President Lech Walesa 
in July 1994, see William 1. Clinton, Public Papers (1994), p. 1206. 
292 Talbott encouraged Christopher to bring Holbrooke back from his post as ambassador to Germany to 
be Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in summer 1994, both to fix the Bosnia policy and to 
work on NATO enlargement. Goldgeier, p. 96. 
293 Speech by Secretary of Defense William 1. Perry during the Wehrkundetagung conference in Munich, 
in u.s. Policy Information and Texts, 12 (2 July 1995), pp. 10-14. 
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On the German side, despite the fact that Defense Minister Ruhe repeatedly called 
for a discussion of NATO enlargement in the spring of 1993, the main concern was that 
moving quickly to expand the Alliance would trigger a backlash in Russia that would 
endanger European security. As German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel argued: "We 
cannot risk reviving East-West strategic rivalry. It would be tragic if reassuring some 
countries, we alarmed others."294 "Chancellor Kohl, as always the stickler for political 
correctness, sometimes hinted that he supported the idea and sometimes regarded it as 
'premature', depending on whom he was speaking to."295 The German government was 
not pushing for the rapid expansion of the Alliance. 
In this setting, in the run-up to the December 1994 ministerial meeting of the 
NAC, the u.s. proposed a six-to-eight-month study of enlargement. Germany, along 
with France, argued successfully in favor of a longer study and played a leading role in 
modifying the American proposal. 296 NATO subsequently decided to study the questions 
of "why" and "how" before tackling the questions of "who" and "when." Thus, the 
answers to the first two questions were set out in the Alliance's September 1995 Study on 
NATO Enlargement--a document that laid out seven rationales for enlargement.297 
294 Klaus Kinkel, "NATO Requires a Bold But Balanced Response to the East," International Herald 
Tribune, 21 October 1993. 
295 Eyal, p. 704. 
296 Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Enlargement," in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO's 
Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 1997), p. 127. 
297 See Study on NATO Enlargement, par. 3. 
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The study reflected the summer 1995 debate on the long-term effects of NATO 
enlargement inside the U.S. administration. The administration hoped that the 
enlargement would have two effects: the consolidation of the new democracies and the 
prevention of big-power rivalries and spheres of influence in Europe.298 Talbott, now 
Deputy Secretary of State, considered that the prospect of NATO membership might push 
reforms further in CEE and that various border and minority conflicts might receive a 
peaceful settlement. 299 
Holbrooke tended to reflect the geopolitical perspective.30o The U.S. engagement 
would be necessary also in the future in order to assure stability and a balanced 
relationship between the CEE countries and to prevent the resurgence of historic rivalries. 
The possible spread of unrest and destruction from this region to Western Europe raised 
serious security concerns. Furthermore, the uncertainty there had repeatedly triggered 
aggressive behavior by the two big nations on the flanks of Central Europe, Germany and 
Russia.301 
At least parts of the Administration, therefore, stick to the traditional logic 
which contends that Europe is threatened by old security dilemmas and 
298 Warren Christopher, "America's Leadership, America's Opportunity," Foreign Policy, vol. 98 (Spring 
1995), pp. 6-27. 
299 Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," The New York Review o/Books, 10 August 1995, pp. 27-
30. 
300 Talbot encouraged Christopher to bring Holbrooke back from his post as ambassador to Germany to be 
Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs in summer 1994, both to fix the Bosnia policy and to work 
on NATO enlargement. Goldgeier, p. 96. 
301 Richard Holbrooke, "America, a European Power," in Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2 (March/April 
1995), pp. 38-51. 
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rivalries if the USA fails to assume the leading role there. There is an 
unspoken underlying conviction that an unstable Europe has negative 
repercussions on the security and economy of the USA. A continuation of 
the policy of "benign hegemony," therefore, seems expedient, in which the 
interests of other countries are incorporated into the definition of 
[America's] own national interest. From this viewpoint, the enlargement 
of NATO is primarily attributable to the interest of the USA in a 
continuation of its role as a European power, not to any desire for the 
"neo-containment" of Russia. 302 
The study allowed the Germans once more to repeat the official rhetoric of the 
enlargement process. Arguments in favor of near-term enlargement honoring West's 
moral responsibility to democratic European neighbors were combined with those against 
early enlargement as a reflection of the debates that took place in the traditional German 
classe politique. Thus, considerations such as projecting stability eastward, not allowing 
Russia a veto over NATO's security arrangements, fulfilling the West's moral 
responsibility to democratic European neighbors, and providing a framework for the 
long-term consolidation of democratization and free-market economic reform and for 
more effective resolution of minority and border disputes among eEE countries were 
opposed to the risks of provoking nationalist reactions in Russia and the paralysis of 
NATO's decision-making abilities, the importation of new instabilities into the Alliance 
in the form of minority and border disputes, and the drawing of new dividing lines in 
Europe.303 
302 Rudolf, p. 3. 
303 See Karsten Voigt, The Enlargement of the Alliance, Draft Special Report of the Working Group on 
NATO Enlargement, North Atlantic Assembly, November 1994. 
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Moreover, the official rhetoric also brought together, as any document of German 
foreign or security policy that involves the overlapping responsibilities of the ministries 
of foreign affairs and defense, as well as the pervasive overall responsibility of the 
Chancellor's Office, the divergent positions among the Kohl-Kinkel-Ruhe troika.304 
F or Germany integration of the CEE countries in Western security structures was 
the main aim. Thus, the study reflected Germany's request not to regard the geographical 
enlargement of the security guarantee as an aim of enlargement but as the result of 
membership305 and Germany's interest in establishing a clear link between integration, 
stability and peaceful relations.306 This attitude, which represented generally far more 
grounds for skepticism than support, characterized also the analyses on NATO 
enlargement published by German experts in Britain and the U.S.307 However, in NATO 
Europe Germany was probably the strongest proponent of enlargement. 
It should be also noted that "the development of American policy with regard to 
NATO enlargement was strongly influenced by domestic policy aspects,"308 in which 
304 Usually the party coalition politics in Germany led to positions characterized by less than total 
coherence and by mild to serious discord. For a complete analysis of the different profiles of Kohl, Kinkel 
and Ruhe see Roger Morgan, "Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy," in Bertel Heurlin, ed., Germany and 
Europe in the Nineties (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), pp. 152-178. 
305 This was an attempt to remove as far as possible Russian fears of enlargement. 
306 de Wijk, p. 91. In this way the importance of NATO's internal pacifying function was stressed. 
307 See Holger M. Mey, "New Members-New Mission: The Real Issues Behind the New NATO Debate, 
Comparative Strategy, vol. 13, no. 2 (April/June 1994), Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO 
Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (Spring 1995); and Josef Joffe, "Is There Life After Victory? What 
NA TO Can Do, " The National Interest (Fall 1995). 
308 Rudolf, p. 4. 
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pressure from the Congress played a major role. At least three factors were decisive in 
shaping the decision to formally invite the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland at the 
NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 to begin accession talks with a view to signing 
protocols of accession in December 1997 and completing the ratification process in "time 
for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in 
April 1999."309 
First, Senator Richard Lugar and others expressed concern about the USA's 
leadership role in Europe and the continued existence of NATO. His motto "out of area 
or out of business" encompassed NATO's extension and the assumption of new tasks. 
Second, the surge for "neo-containment" had its influence. The call for NATO 
enlargement become louder following growing doubts in 1994 about Russia's willingness 
to cooperate (especially the difficulties regarding the acceptance of the PFP initiative and 
the ratification of the SALT II Treaty). 310 Third, domestic politics and both presidential 
and congressional elections had their particular input. The Republicans wanted to 
dissociate themselves from Clinton's "Russia first" policy and, at the same time, to win 
votes from the Americans of Polish, Czech and Hungarian origin. The prevention of a 
"second Yalta" became their favorite slogan, targeting especially "those sixteen states in 
309 Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, published at the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Madrid, 8 July 1997, par. 6. 
3lO The anti-Russian motive was strongly voiced by the conservative Republican Jesse Helms, the 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
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which 6 to 18 percent of the population are of eastern Central European and Eastern 
European origin. "311 
Taking into account the plurality of ideas in American political debates and the 
fact that there is often a high degree of congruence between public opinion and political 
decisions-not only in the field of foreign policy- but in the U.S. as a whole, the 
following overview might provide a more accurate picture of the NATO enlargement 
debate and its final result in the Congress: 
Despite the lopsided 82-13 Senate vote in favor of ratification of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, the Truman administration faced opposition from three 
elements: isolationists, defense hawks, and liberal internationalists. This 
political triangle shows signs of forming again, possibly more potently 
that in 1949.312 
On the German side, from the beginning there "has never been much open 
criticism or strong public opinion against the idea itself."313 Acknowledging that NATO 
enlargement serves Germany's political, strategic, and moral interests, the parliamentary 
groups of the ruling coalition parties (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social 
311 Rudolf, p. 3. This was reflected, among others, in the new version of the National Security 
Revitalization Act (H.R. 7) adopted by the House of Representatives in February 1985, which includes (as 
Title VI) the NATO Expansion Act of 1995; the NATO Participation Act (adopted by the Congress on 2 
November 1994); the draft version of the NATO Participation Act Amendments of 1995; and, the NATO 
Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996. 
312 Jeremy D. Rosner, "NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75 (July/August 
1996), pp. 14-15. In March 1997, Mr. Rosner became the Special Adviser to the President and to the 
Secretary of State for NA TO Enlargement Ratification. 
313 Kamp and Weilemann, p. 4. 
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Union-CDU/CSU Demokratische Union and Free Democratic Party-FDP) in the 
Bundestag, as well as those of the Social Democratic Party-SPD (notwithstanding a 
dissenting minority of pacifists), strongly supported enlargement. The Green Party 
Coalition '90 (with a strong anti-NATO history) was deeply split between the anti-NATO 
faction and the one that has seen enlargement as the lesser evil, while the only opposing 
party remained the Party of Democratic Socialism-PDS (the heir of the former Socialist 
Unity Party/Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands-SED).314 
Thus, "German ratification of NATO enlargement is likely to give raise to little 
argument and be concluded by the early summer 1998, before parliament goes into recess 
and the heated phase of the national election campaign begins."315 
E. FINAL REMARKS 
After the 1989 events in CEE, the changing strategic landscape attracted Europe's 
attention. The Cold War concern about instability at the heart of a partitioned Germany 
and a divided continent was supplanted by anxiety over potential instability centered 
along two geographic arcs running along the periphery of the continent. One was the 
Eastern arc, running from the Baltic Sea in Northern Europe south between Germany and 
Russia through the Balkans to the Black Sea. The other one was the Southern arc, running 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid., p. 3. 
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through North Africa and the Mediterranean into Turkey and including the Greater 
Middle East region.316 
In this context, the NACC was established at the end of 1991 to provide a link 
between the NATO countries and the former Warsaw Pact states. It was not originally 
envisaged as an all-European organization with membership that would include neutral 
and non-aligned nations of Europe. 
NACC had a special role in helping to manage the allocation of 
conventional force reductions among the states of the former Soviet 
Union. It has also become a forum for exchanging information among the 
NATO and former WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] countries on 
many types of security issues, including peacekeeping.3 1 7 
The PFP, "initially designed to postpone the pressing requests of Central and 
Eastern European countries for NATO membership,"318 proved its success as the 
provider of a tailored menu of options for engagement according to the preferences of 
each partner and as a unique experiment in peacekeeping (Bosnia). Both NACC (through 
multilateral channels) and PFP (by developing bilateral activities) laid the political 
groundwork for possible NATO enlargement.319 
316 On the twin arcs, see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New 
NATO," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), pp. 28-40. 
317 James Goodby, "Can Collective Security Work? Reflections on the European Case," in Chester A. 
Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, Manging Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to 
International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 248. 
318 Kamp and Weilemann, p. 11. 
319 Brown, p. l36. 
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These initiatives proved that German and American interests overlap in Eastern 
Europe-the two countries wanting this region to remain as stable as possible. "As long as 
the US aspires to be a European power and extends a security guarantee to key European 
countries, above all Germany, it will be inevitably concerned about major political and 
economic developments in Eastern Europe."320 Thus, their policies toward the region 
were closely coordinated and "Germany is destined to become [from the U.S. 
perspective] the major political and economic actor in the region."321 
After the end of the Cold War, the "US has retained its normative principles-
democracy and free-market economics-as well as its claim to global leadership; its 
methods of implementation have changed."322 The Clinton administration is following a 
strategy of "engagement and enlargement"323 that aims at the further integration of states 
and regions into the democratic and free-market structure of the West. At the same time, 
it has given up its primary focus on Europe. This focus was the result of the political and 
military conflict with the Soviet Union and served America's policy of containment. In 
the new environment, for the U.S., "[a]lliances have become instruments for achieving 
certain political goals, and allies are seen as partners in burden-sharing. "324 
320 Asmus, "Germany and America: Partners in Leadership?," p. 552. 
321 Ibid., p. 553. 
322 Haftendorn, p. 108. 
323 See A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, Washington, 
D.C., February 1996. 
324 Haftendorn, p. 109. 
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"In this respect the Americans have great expectations for Germany which the 
present administration views as the most powerful partner in Europe due to its 
demographic potential, stable political structure and economic power."325 Thus, "[i]n the 
balance between threats and capacities at the crux of security, Germany will increasingly 
contribute to the capacities of an alliance for common defense while driving the 
economic engine of Europe."326 Moreover, in order to avoid a German-Russian security 
competition in CEE,327 the u.s. had to address Germany's security concems.328 These 
might be considered the essential and decisive points in understanding "who," "when" 
and "why" in the process of NATO enlargement. 
However, "the appeal by the Central Europeans to erase the line drawn for them in 
1945, the need to demonstrate U.S. leadership at the time when others questioned it, the 
domestic political consensus, and his own Wilsonian orientation toward spreading 
liberalism combined"329 were also important factors which encouraged President Clinton 
to push for NATO's enlargement toward CEE after mid-1994. 
325 Ibid. 
326 Nelson, p. 73. 
327 And the renationalization of Western defense and security policies. 
328 However, from the American perspective, one of the greatest threats posed to the U.S.-German 
relationship during 1990-1994 was the possibility that the mood in America might tum hostile toward 
eEE, at the time when the Germans were still inclined "to work" with Russia. 
329 Goldgeier, p. 101. 
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With the overcoming of the division of Europe and the regaining of its full 
sovereignty Germany has returned to the international stage. "Germany is Europe's 
central power."330 Thus, Germany increasingly asserted its preferences regarding the 
future of CEE after 1989 and it tried to define the parameters of its post-Cold War 
relationship with the Americans. Bonn wanted more economic and political investment 
in CEE than Washington was ready to allocate. When the U.S. was unable to articulate a 
strategy for Europe, it looked to Bonn to take the lead. 
Germany also needs to cooperate closely with the Americans. In Europe the U.S. 
continues to represent a factor of stability. U.S. engagement relieves the concerns of 
some of Germany's neighbors that Germany could strive to attain a hegemonic position 
in Europe.331 It also makes Germany's leading economic role politically acceptable to 
other European states. However, this only operates under the condition that the U.S. 
"balancing function" is not directed against German policy.332 This might become an 
issue in German politics in the future. 
330 Boer, p. 4. 
331 Nelson, pp. 66-70. 
332 After 1989, it might be argued, the U.S. also tried to limit German power in the new Europe, by 
encouraging German involvement in NATO and European international organizations, while at the same 
time working with the U.K., France and other countries in order to limit the degree of German influence 
over those organizations. 
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In order to avoid such a perspective, with Bush's invitation to establish a German-
American "partnership in leadership"333 and Clinton's view that "America has no better 
friend than Chancellor Kohl,"334 "Germany, rather than the UK, began to act as 
America's senior partner. This role found its expression in joint initiatives such as the 
proposal for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and NATO's Partnership 
for Peace program."335 
The complementarity shown by Germany and the U.S. during the process of 
NATO enlargement proved that they have overcome some difficult moments in their 
relations during 1990-1992. Taking into account the fact that the hallmark of a special 
relationship is the ability to overcome crises, the two countries proved that they can 
remain pivotal partners (both to each other and to the international community) as long 
they are able to refashion in strategic terms their new security "bargain." 
In order to accommodate these new requirements, a "layer-cake" that reflected 
German interests was developed. 
333 See President's Bush speech, "Proposals for a Free and Peaceful Europe" delivered in May 1989 and 
reprinted by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Current Policy, no. 1, June 1989, p. 179. 
334 As quoted in Karen Domfried, German Foreign Policy: Regional Priorities and Global Debuts, CRS 
Report for Congress, 25 October 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1995), p. 23. 
335 Mayer, p. 733. 
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Germany aimed to create interlinked layers of stability with a fully 
integrated core Europe at the center, surrounded by a layer of bilateral and 
multilateral affiliation agreements with eastern Europe, combined with a 
second layer of strong bilateral and multilateral support for Russia. This 
order would be secured by a transatlantic layer of relationships with a 
deepened German-American central axis.336 
The Alliance's decision to enlarge toward CEE, with NATO membership for 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, will not address all the economic, political and 
social problems that the CEE region is facing. A complementarity between the European 
Union (EU) and NATO is necessary to solve the delicate problems of European security. 
Despite the fact that there are countless references to this complementarity in official 
communiques, only in the last two to three years has there been an acceptance of this 
principle in U.S. thinking. 
An increased role for the EU in security policy, especially in CEE, is necessary, 
and the Americans need to develop a better appreciation of this fact.337 This might be 
required because, "[t]he strategy of [NATO] enlargement was correct, but its execution 
was poor," and thus, " with a bit of luck, some of its negative consequences will not be 
permanent. "338 
336 Ibid. 
337 However, this is not a zero-sum game, in which one organization's gain is necessarily another's loss. 




There can be no doubt that the continuities of the Cold War are gone and that a 
fundamentally new Gennan-American relationship emerged after the transition period of 
1990-1992. The glue of the pre-1989 alliance, the external Soviet threat, had dissipated, 
and with it the "strategic partnership" and security imperative between Bonn and 
Washington, and Gennany's dependence on the U.S. 
In this new setting, the projection of U.S. power is constrained by America's 
preoccupation with internal affairs and a concomitant effort to devolve power and 
responsibility to Gennany as the leading power in Europe. Gennany is considered by the 
Americans as having the potential, but not yet the political will, to define and pursue its 
national interests, which had largely been submerged before unification in the dominance 
of Moralpolitik over Realpolitik, in a constructive fashion. 
In tenns of post-1989 Gennan-American relations, admitting that Cold War 
security imperatives no longer drive the decision-making of any actor in the international 
system, we might consider the fact that Gennany and the U.S. have a security partnership 
in which they are more equal in their mutual dependence. The old concept of leadership, 
where problems, resources and choices were often clear and implied Gennan deference to 
American decisions, is no longer efficient. Thus, the new Gennan-American relationship 
requires a more realistic assessment of needs and resources, including a recognition that 
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burden-sharing is essential, and, perhaps, that uncertainties about outcomes need to be 
communicated to publics before action is taken. 
However, Germany's commitment to European integration and the Franco-
German couple is essential for the country's security, and stabilization to the East is of 
great importance as well. Thus, the German architecture for Europe developed in the 
post-Cold War period includes three primary elements: the self-containment of German 
military power in order that Germany may use its economic power to influence its 
European neighbors in pursuit of German policy objectives; the creation of an 
independent Europe capable of negotiating on a more equal basis with the u.s. on 
economic issues; and, the continued development of a more positive security situation in 
Europe, which depends upon the sustained growth of democracy and the free market in 
the former member states of the Warsaw Pact. 
Yet NATO remains the key institution in the German strategy: NATO is 
considered essential to the creation of European political and security identity; NATO is, 
furthermore, considered the only credible guarantor of European (and German) security; 
NATO serves as reinsurance against the potential failure of political and economic 
liberalization efforts in Eastern Europe, including the Russian Federation; and NATO 
appears to be the only viable security institution capable of supporting order in the Euro-
Atlantic region. In this setting the Germans might be well-advised to persist in refusing 
to make unambiguous choices between NATO and other European security institutions, 
partly because there is no compelling reason to make such a choice at this moment and 
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partly because these institutions are in fact complementary rather than competitive, at 
least for now. 
Institutions offered methods to German politics and ensured that expectations 
were met and that national behavior could be assessed. They also established deadlines 
and thereby fostered decision-making. Multilateral institutions brought military, political 
and economic power into alignment. This is of particular importance considering 
Germany's "weakness": the U.S. predominance is constrained and subjected to European 
influence in NATO, and French pressure is counterbalanced in the EU. Germany can 
thus be expected to continue playing a key role as initiator and participant in various 
institutional frameworks, at the same time striving to modify their boundaries by 
changing the policies of these international institutions in specific desired directions. 
Germany could not afford to decide between Paris and Washington, and in the 
years to come it might become more and more difficult for Bonn to balance the Franco-
American couple. On one hand, the Franco-German couple, as an alliance of Europe's 
leading powers, would continue to be a central actor in continental Europe, and could 
control the speed of movement toward a closer political union. On the other hand, the 
Germans need to maintain NATO and, above all, the U.S. security tie as the ultimate 
insurance treaty against the resurgence of a Russian threat. As in the past, the Atlantic 
anchor and counterweight reassure not only Germany but also its neighbors by removing 
the sting of the country's power and centrality in the European balance. 
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However, with the unification of Europe a medium or long-term perspective, with 
the prospects for a coherent EU military policy-or even a functioning ESDI-uncertain 
at best, with an increasing European military dependence on the Americans, and with 
German defense budgets under great pressure, Germany might in the near future give 
priority to its American partner. 
The consequences of this decision might be translated as follows. First, the close 
German-American coordination and cooperation in the field of relations with the Russian 
Federation and the other CEE countries, shown during the process of NATO enlargement, 
would be continued, if not strengthened. Second, a gap could become more evident 
inside the "Berlin four" group (an informal great-power directorate, which includes the 
u.S., the U.K., France and Germany, and which has apparently had great influence in 
NATO since the mid-1950s) in terms of real decision-making. The German-American 
pole might become prominent and assume a de facto leading role in developing and 
implementing NATO's priorities and policies, at the expense of the Franco-British pole. 
As Richard Burt, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs during 
the Reagan administration, noted in his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on 3 May 1995: "British and French attitudes need not drive the American 
position. Once the United States and Germany have agreed on a course of action, they 
are sure to follow."339 
339 As cited in Peter Rudolf, "The Future of the United Sates as a European Power: The Case of NATO 
Enlargement," European Security, vol. 5, no. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 195. 
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This polarization might be also the consequence of the debate that the Alliance is 
facing between collective security and collective defense. With the perspective of 
possibly developing an unreliable system of collective security (as a result, for example, 
of the recent NATO enlargement and of the possible similarities that could become more 
evident between EAPC and OSCE, which might undermine the Alliance's cohesion and 
effectiveness), the major Western powers might seek other instruments to protect their 
national security interests. Thus, an intensified and strengthened German-American 
bilateral defense coalition might arise as a normal solution. 
To assure the future of the transatlantic relationship--for which France would 
remain a crucial factor--and as a response to the increasing position held by Germany, the 
Americans must elaborate a more fully layered partnership with Germany and Europe. 
This might include bilateral partnerships between the U.S. and individual countries (such 
as France and Germany) that would have to be complementary to the larger EU-U.S. 
relationship in a fashion similar to the functioning of the Franco-German partnership in 
the context of the EU. 
The ability and determination of the United States to lead in the post-Cold War 
period remain open questions. President Clinton has sounded Wilsonian themes such as: 
"It is time for America to lead a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as 
the global alliance that defeated communism."340 But it remains uncertain whether the 
340 President Bill Clinton quoted in Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide 
Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 320. 
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transatlantic security relationship will survive the absence of the Soviet threat, the 
presence of a united Germany, and the erosion of U.S. Cold War authority. As Mary N. 
Hampton has asked, 
Finally, is community-building in fact possible when unaccompanied by 
the objective of defense against an external threat? Assuming that 
community-building does remain valid for the recast NATO and trans-
Atlantic relations, whose community-building scheme will be applied to 
incorporate the former East bloc? These are central questions that must be 
answered in the coming years.341 
341 Mary N. Hampton, The Wilsonian Impulse: u.s. Foreign Policy, the Alliance and German Unification 
(Westport: Praeger, 1996), p. 150. 
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